Great Debate: Great Flop—*Willard Shelton*

THE *Nation*

April 7, 1951

Regimenting the Americas

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

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Rearmament's Rising Tempo

BY FRITZ STERNBERG

*

Impasse in Iran - - - - - *Keith Hutchison*

The Vatican View - - - *George La Piana*

E. C. A.'s Blunders in Italy - - *Mario Rossi*

Plus Ça Change - - - - *Alexander Werth*

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THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

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The Shape of Things

THE WAR IN KOREA SEEMED, AT THE START of the week to be entering a stage of indefinite stalemate, with the issue of the Thirty-eighth Parallel becoming more and more urgent. There appeared little danger that General MacArthur would again attempt a drive to the Manchurian border: that had been practically ruled out in statements from both President Truman and Secretary Marshall. But the General's strategy of movement, aimed at "killing the enemy" and keeping his forces off balance, could as effectively defeat any new attempt at settlement by ignoring the Parallel wherever it seemed tactically desirable and permitting no let-up in the fighting. Washington seems to have accepted this as necessary, and the American press has followed suit; the New York *Times* even emphasized its agreement by removing the Thirty-eighth Parallel from its daily war map!

✶

BUT IN LONDON AND ELSEWHERE ABROAD, the suspicion that MacArthur definitely wishes to prolong the war and carry it ultimately to China itself, a suspicion intensified by his tricky truce proposal of March 24, has led to a renewed press barrage against the U. S.–U. N. Commander. According to Howard K. Smith, speaking over C. B. S. from London last Sunday, MacArthur's move, rejected unofficially but violently in Peking, has had the effect of postponing and forcing revision of a new Western policy statement aimed at ending the conflict in Korea. Whether or not this was his deliberate intention, the result will be another wave of bloody fighting unless a halt at the political frontier is definitely ordered. The British have officially advised Washington that they favor a halt, and this judgment is overwhelmingly indorsed by the press. The strength of public feeling in Britain can be gauged from the comment in the liberal *News-Chronicle* that it was "time someone had the pluck to tell this aging General he should quit." Even the ardently pro-American *Economist* referred to MacArthur's truce proposal as "one of the most mischievous of all his pronouncements." These are strong words but no stronger than those spoken by Canada's able and circumspect Secretary of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, who remarked that it was "as unwise and dangerous" for generals to lay down political strategy as for diplomats to lay down military strategy. The issue of the Thirty-eighth Parallel will continue to disturb informed observers of the Korean war until the shooting ends and the work of making a settlement begins. In fact, we suggest that the New York *Times* restore that black line to its maps; it is still news.

✶

UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM REPUBLICANS and the press Senator Kefauver somewhat reluctantly accepted an extension of but thirty days in the life of his crime-investigating committee. It seems clear that the extension was necessary to allow time for the drafting of a cogent report. The committee had conducted sensational public hearings almost up to its scheduled March 31 deadline, without any opportunity for the calm reflection it would need to produce well-balanced proposals for legislation to correct the evils revealed during the hearings. It is on the basis of these proposals that the committee will ultimately be judged. To horrify the people by exposing links between gamblers, former bootleggers, and politicians is one thing; to offer suggestions for curing the evils is a much more difficult task. Senator Kefauver apparently has decided ideas about the distinction between those areas in which his committee should propose new legislation and those in which it should simply call for more vigorous local law enforcement. The committee as a whole seems to have rejected legalized gambling as a solution. But it is doubtful whether it has faced squarely the problems arising out of the official sanction given to race-track gambling in many states. This privileged betting furnishes almost irresistible temptations to the entrepreneurs catering to the gambling desires of the public. The standard of conduct of public officials may be raised by the Kefauver hearings. But the role of the federal government in dealing with illegal gambling existing by the toleration of local officials is a subject warranting extremely careful recommendations.

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THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT VINCENT AURIOL of France has produced mutual assurances of full support in the Atlantic Pact and a general atmosphere of good-will on both sides. Whether it will affect very much the basic problems of French rearmament—both

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economic and political—is doubtful. Certainly France is trying to meet the material and military burdens it assumed under the alliance, but what this will mean in terms of living standards and political reactions is yet to be learned. Nothing President Auriol has said will alter certain facts which have been discussed less fully than they deserve in the press and over the air. One was well illustrated by the reports from Paris that the French government's decision to supply General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny with 13,000 additional troops for Indo-China would actually impede its progress in fulfilling French military obligations to General Eisenhower. Another was the statement by Harold Callender in last Sunday's *Times* that the probable effect of French rearmament will be to reduce the already much too low standard of living of the workers and thus handicap still further the efforts to enlist their loyalty and cooperation in the grand plan of Western European defense. It is to be assumed that, at least in the course of his private conversations in Washington, the French President brought up these discomforting realities, for in the end they will determine the success or failure of the Atlantic Alliance.

*

SINCE JANUARY 1 FEDERAL REVENUE HAS been mounting far more rapidly than federal expenditure, and on March 27, with only three months of the fiscal year to go, the Treasury's surplus passed the $5 billion mark. This is a much more comfortable position than seemed possible three months ago, and it is now most unlikely that the President's estimate of a $2,700,000,000 deficit for the current fiscal year will be realized: in fact, Treasury officials expect that there will be a surplus. There are two reasons for this improvement in the fiscal picture. The increased taxes voted by Congress last year have produced a yield beyond anticipation, owing largely to the rise in prices which has swollen the total of both individual and corporate incomes. In addition, spending has been at a lower rate than estimated. In fact, in the nine months ending March 27 it was but little greater than in the corresponding period of fiscal 1950. Despite all the talk about government extravagance, the outlay for civilian purposes has been cut appreciably; and while defense orders are huge—they are now being placed at a monthly rate of $5 billion—actual expenditure on military equipment and supplies is still below $1 billion a month.

*

THERE IS UNDOUBTEDLY A CONNECTION between this fiscal situation and the recent signs of a minor—very minor—recession. At this time the government is not contributing directly to inflation; on the contrary, by taking billions more from the economy than it is putting back it is exerting some deflationary pres-

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sure. That is one reason why consumers' demand for some goods has fallen short of suppliers' anticipations. The dollar volume of department-store sales in the week ending March 24—the pre-Easter period when buying is apt to be heavier than usual—was only 9 per cent greater than a year ago, which meant, allowing for price increases, little or no rise in physical volume. That helps to explain why manufacturers and distributors of some lines—textiles in particular—are beginning to worry about the inventories to which they were adding so feverishly a short time ago, and why stores are showing some disposition to cut prices. This development is certainly a lucky break for the price stabilizers, just as the current budget surplus aids a Congress reluctant to face the necessity of still higher taxes. But we hope it will not encourage either Administration or Congress to believe that inflation has been permanently checked. We may have reached a temporary price plateau, but when defense production really gets rolling—by fall at latest—we will again see civilian demand pressing heavily on supply unless meanwhile increased taxes and more stringent credit restrictions have been adopted to reinforce more effective price controls.

*

SPAIN'S INTERNAL TROUBLES, AS WELL AS ITS continuing impact on the West's international policy, prove how vain was the hope of a quiet peninsula stabilized by American loans and preparing in orderly fashion to contribute substantial forces to the new European defense organization. Talk about the inclusion of Franco in the projected Mediterranean Alliance died down when the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, during his Washington talks, described France as completely opposed to the whole idea. In London, at the same time, Foreign Secretary Morrison, through one of his spokesmen, repeated the refusal of the British government to modify its stand on Spain. Washington's alternative to a Mediterranean Alliance which would include Franco has been a bilateral pact between Madrid and Washington. But here too an unforeseen difficulty has arisen. In return for his help in defending the West Franco is insisting upon certain conditions, chief of which is the delivery, on a basis of priority, of all the arms he needs to turn his famous twenty-two division into a moderately modern army. (Foreigners present at Franco's victory celebration on April 1 commented upon the poor equipment of the troops on parade.) People in Washington realize that no matter how much they may wish to make a deal with the Spanish dictator, they can hardly grant him priority at the expense of France and the other countries already in the Atlantic Pact. Meanwhile dispatches from Spain report a general mobilization of police in Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao, where labor leaders have called for new anti-Franco demonstrations in the next few days. Edward Knoblauch, International News correspondent in Madrid, who is usually skeptical about the strength of the Franco opposition, acknowledged in an impressive story early this week that the Barcelona strike had given fresh courage to the anti-Franco forces and that for the first time the situation began to look serious.

*

ANOTHER WEEK HAS PASSED WITHOUT ANY progress in Washington on the wheat-for-India bill. Meanwhile the government at New Delhi is struggling to avert fast approaching famine by importing grain in small amounts from any country that will sell it. China, which recently agreed to send India 50,000 tons of rice in exchange for jute products, has now offered to supply most of the foodstuffs India needs to meet its immediate emergency—possibly 1,000,000 tons—on relatively easy terms. Russia has offered 50,000 tons of wheat, also to be paid for in jute. But while India considers these proposals from the two major Communist states, the American Congress wrangles over Nehru's political views and his refusal to support our policy in Korea. Needless to say, the stock of Stalin and Mao rises in New Delhi while that of the United States sinks low; even those Indians who stoutly oppose communism and Russian expansion have been embittered by the unfavorable implication that grain-rich America is prepared to feed only those who follow its "line." As a maneuver in the cold war, quite apart from considerations of humanity, Washington's delay in sending the two million tons of grain to India must be counted a disastrous failure.

*

THE POSSIBILITY THAT SHAKESPEARE REALLY wrote Shakespeare provides an island of relative calm in the tempest of current events. The recent disclosure by Alan Keen in London of the existence of a book which contains marginal notes perhaps penned by the poet himself may seem an item of inconsequence beside the Big Four's comedy of errors, but among students of Shakespeare the discovery caused tremors of excitement. Scholarly seismographs recorded the event as earth-shaking, for if it is finally authenticated, this will be the first specimen of writing known to be in the Bard's own hand. The theory that Francis Bacon wrote the plays has not held much water in learned circles of the twentieth century, nor has Shakespeare's "small Latin and less Greek" caused much anxiety to those who recognize him as the world's greatest playwright. Although Mr. Keen's announcement may finally cut these two Gordian knots in Shakesperiana, the real significance of the discovery is that Shakespeare is still news. The excitement caused in the literary world symbolizes our continued devotion, in spite of international chaos, to the eternal human values.

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Incomplete Report

CHARLES E. WILSON'S first quarterly report as Defense Mobilizer, released last Monday, was calculated to arouse enthusiasm among persons easily impressed by charts, graphs, and bold-fact summaries of production statistics. Defense orders are flowing at the rate of nearly $50 billion a year; defense spending, which is a better measure of actual output, has reached an annual rate of $24 billion, and by the end of the year will match the rate of orders. Within the next three years production will be expanded sufficiently to support $50 billion in arms, plus as much civilian production as we had prior to the Korean war. Guns, and butter too, by 1953—this is Mr. Wilson's promise. Yet his report reveals how seriously we are lagging in the social aspects of mobilization.

His brief summary of tax-amortization privileges granted under the mobilization program, for example, took no account of the storm brewing in Congress over the fact that practically all such concessions have gone to big corporations. Many of these companies had expansion plans before Korea and did not need tax inducements to persuade them to carry out the plans, but the concessions were granted. Despite Wilson's warm tribute to small business in his report, it may be noted that Congress has had to intervene to check aluminum and rubber allocation orders, issued or planned by the mobilizers, that would have severely damaged small business.

Something must be done, Wilson admitted in his report, to strengthen economic controls. But this has been obvious for months, and if improvements have been planned, they have not been disclosed. Eric Johnston, the Economic Stabilizer, does not have a functioning Wage Stabilization Board, and Wilson's attitude toward labor is a positive handicap to Johnston. It is surely part of the mobilization chairman's job to see that unions have a full opportunity to contribute to democracy's defense. Yet at a press conference last week Wilson stated publicly that he still "didn't know" whether appointment of a labor leader as a top adviser would improve matters.

In the light of his report as well as of his previous record Wilson still must be considered fundamentally a production man, perhaps a very good one but lacking in the understanding of human problems needed in the head civilian organizer of a working democracy. A continuation of his arrogant attitude toward labor and failure to set up effective economic controls will lead inevitably to an outbreak of strikes as contracts expire and contract clauses providing wage increases mature. This may have profound political effects. The successful mobilization of a democracy depends not only on the production of arms. Wilson, it is clear, will never understand this; but Mr. Truman should.

Look Homeward, Angel

IN A remarkable speech last week Senator Fulbright of Arkansas called for a commission of eminent citizens "to consider the problem of ethical standards of conduct in public affairs." No one familiar with this Senator's record will question the genuineness of his motives. Neither is it possible to deny that the moral climate of the country has become as oppressive as he says it is, with corruption flourishing in government, in business, and even in college sports; and with an easy-going official tolerance of malpractice that manages to keep within the letter of the law.

With Senator Fulbright's observations and with his purpose we are in full accord, but when he says, "I confess that I do not know what should be done" beyond the creating of a commission, he seems to have given too little thought to his immediate surroundings. For a Senator dedicated to moral housecleaning there is no better place to begin than the Senate of the United States, where corruption is none the less virulent because it derives not from graft but from the lust for political advantage. The fact is that the Senate is sick with the immorality of McCarthyism, and appears not to know how far the disease has progressed.

There was a period when McCarthy's scorn of ethics shocked his Senate colleagues and stung a group of his fellow-Republicans into repudiating him in a "declaration of conscience," a time when he was flayed on the floor of the Senate for outrageous lying without a voice lifted in his defense. That was before his tactics appeared to pay off in votes. It was before he went into Maryland and punished his nemesis, Senator Tydings, in a campaign of intolerable viciousness and fraud.

The nature of that campaign has now been revealed before an investigating subcommittee—the distribution of a fabricated "photograph" showing Tydings in intimate conversation with Earl Browder and the use of large out-of-state contributions obtained through McCarthy and unreported until the Senate got wind of them. And there was the cynical admission of Butler's campaign manager that, as a professional publicity man, he had systematically sought to exploit the public's doubts concerning Tydings's patriotism which McCarthy had just as systematically planted.

What Tydings rightly calls "the moral squalor" of this campaign—and there was more of it than can be recounted in this space—has been made clear to the country and the Senate. And what have been the reactions? Senator Welker, who with Bing Crosby's assistance won out in Idaho last November, demanded to know how long the Senate was "going to sit by and see this duly elected member of this body, John Marshall Butler, crucified by the man he had defeated." In his opinion

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the faked picture was "very clever." Senator Knowland joined in the attack on the investigation, and Senator Hickenlooper asked whether the photographic fraud was such a "heinous crime" after all. He compared it to what he claimed were false dust-bowl pictures taken by the Resettlement Administration in 1936!

Those who had formerly stood up to the McCarthys were subdued if not silent. If the Wisconsin demagogue had been able to smear Tydings, a respected conservative and one of the sharpest debaters in the Senate, who was safe in speaking out? Taft, the "man of integrity," and other top Republicans accepted McCarthy as a man who had found the key to victory. His methods may have struck them as crude, but the end justified the means. The champion of the "big lie" became a power in the high councils of his party. Washington correspondents even discussed him as a vice-presidential possibility. Yet nothing had changed except the fact of Tydings's defeat. McCarthy was still the man who had been censured by the Supreme Court of his own state for his misconduct as a judge, the man who had to be brought to book before he would pay his state income taxes. He was still the Senator who had taken $10,000 from the RFC-financed Lustron Corporation for lending his name to a pamphlet on housing while he was a member of a committee investigating housing conditions. He was still the man who had been castigated by a committee of his fellows for having perpetrated a monstrous "fraud and a hoax" on the Senate and had been unable to reply.

From the chamber where McCarthy is now a major figure the poison of cynicism spreads across the country. His imitators have mushroomed up in legislatures from coast to coast. A New York Assemblyman has the effrontery to oppose judicial review of loyalty dismissals on the ground that reversal by a court, "would put a stigma on the [Civil Service] Commission of having fired an innocent man." Better to leave the stigma of guilt on the discharged employee. McCarthy himself has succeeded in frightening off potential sponsors of so popular a radio commentator as Drew Pearson, his sworn enemy, and is reported to have called on advertisers to boycott a Milwaukee paper that opposes him. And so eminent a journalist as David Lawrence now addresses himself to the task of demonstrating that the investigation of the Butler campaign is an infringement of free speech, a betrayal of liberalism, and, if you please, an example of "McCarthyism." In a surpassing burst of hypocrisy he cites the late Justice Holmes on "freedom for the thought we hate," as though a deliberate fraud were to be equated with thought and a huckster's campaign of character assassination with the honest presentation of a point of view.

The Butler affair was not an isolated instance of the new campaign morality. There were others, all of them examples of the unscrupulousness with which our political life has become infected. When a democracy's "moral convictions weaken," Senator Fulbright says, "it becomes easy prey for the demagogue and the charlatan." So it does. All the more reason for Fulbright and his many upright colleagues to promote a resurgence of political morality in the Senate before that body becomes a prey for the demagogues and charlatans in its midst.

Great Debate: Great Flop

BY WILLARD SHELTON

Washington, March 30

IN THE Senate the "great debate" on foreign policy has developed into something more like a great quibble. Those hard-shell isolationists, Senators Taft, Wherry, and Millikin, restored at least logic to the discussion by serving notice that they would try to kill the whole troops-for-Europe proposal by moving to send it back to committee. The vote is scheduled for Monday, April 2. If they fail, the Senators on the other side should have a chance to knock out of the resolution the confusing paragraph written by Senator Smith of New Jersey and to substitute for it a clear-cut declaration approving both the early dispatch of four divisions to reinforce General Eisenhower's North Atlantic forces and the later transfer of additional divisions if the President, after consultation with the appropriate committees, thinks it necessary.

Although all these matters will have been decided by the time this report appears, it may be useful to consider what caused the debate to deteriorate from an occasion of great decision into irrelevance and confusion. One reason, of course, was garden-variety partisanship: Senator Wherry cannot be persuaded that any good thing can come out of Truman, at least not just in advance of a Presidential-election year. Another was the awareness of many Senators that the policies advocated now by Secretary Acheson are in conflict with what he said in 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was before the Senate. At that time Mr. Acheson stated categorically that implementation of the treaty would not require transfer of substantial American forces to Europe in advance of war. The Secretary's explanation is that in 1949 he was talking about one part of the treaty and that action is now proposed under another section. Many Senators realize, however, that Acheson has actually revised his judgment of the situation.

Alexander Smith, with the laudable intention of trying to find "common ground" for all Republicans, finally muddled things hopelessly. After getting the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees to adopt an amendment to the Administration resolution calling for advance Senate approval of the "policy" of sending

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forces to Europe, he argued on the floor that the amendment did not mean what it seemed to mean. Senator Connally, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, grew waspish. Senator Douglas, of Illinois, ordinarily surefooted in reaching his judgments, first demanded a limit on the ratio of American to European divisions and then changed his mind. Senator McCarthy's distinguished contribution was to assert that the Administration's plan to contain the Soviet Union by building up the strength of the West was only a hoax and a fraud.

Constitutionally, no vote of the Senate can diminish by an iota the President's vested powers as commander-in-chief. Subject to the veto power of Congress through withholding appropriations, the President can order American forces wherever he wishes. But the practical political fact is that an open breach between Mr. Truman and the Senate on the movement of troops to Europe might have disastrous effects. Taft, Wherry, and Millikin created one clear-cut issue when they moved to kill the troop transfer outright. Senators Ives, Lodge, McMahon, and McFarland created another when they attacked the Smith "compromise" and proposed an amendment clarifying the Senate's approval of the President's present policy and the general program of military aid for Europe, free of misleading reservations. The vote on these two key proposals will tell the story; the "great debate" would have been more useful if it had concentrated on these issues. Yet the prospective division was so close that Ives and McMahon belatedly offered a weakening revision of their own language in the hope of picking up two or three votes.

MOVED by irresistible public demand, the Senate today voted a thirty-day extension of the Kefauver crime committee. Mr. Truman at a news conference called on every citizen to aid the committee in its war on racketeers. It would have required exceptional political courage for any Senator to vote against extending the committee's life, but privately some of the Democrats are infuriated at the Tennessee Senator's exposure of big-city Democratic machines. Mr. Truman's laudatory comments suggest that the White House hereafter will expedite such inquisitions instead of calling them asinine. Both Kefauver and Senator Fulbright, who has run the RFC investigation, recognize that they have uncovered enough to justify legislation and that non-stop inquiries, exposing nothing new, can run into the ground.

The testimony of former Representative Joseph Casey with regard to his buying and selling of tankers indicates that an investigation of the Maritime Commission would be in order. A Congressional committee might also be well employed in uncovering the facts behind the uproar in the Civil Aeronautics Board, which resulted in the resignation of a chairman of the board after Truman himself had overruled a board order and greatly advanced Juan Trippe's ambitious plan to make Pan-American Airways the single United States air line authorized to fly overseas. Ship charters, air-line licenses, and similar privileges obtainable through the favor of government are a natural objective of persons seeking legitimate and illegitimate profits. It follows that government agencies empowered to hand out favors should be prepared to do their business in a goldfish bowl.

WHILE delivery of the mails continues to go to pot, Postmaster General Donaldson gives the impression that he has no constructive contribution to a solution of the problem of perennial Post Office deficits. Superficially Mr. Donaldson seems to be on solid ground when he argues that either mail rates should be raised in those classes where losses are now suffered or Congress should appropriate money to cover the deficits. He would be better advised to say frankly that the Post Office should not be considered a business institution required to balance revenues and expenditures but a service institution. The prompt movement of the mails, the dissemination of the information contained in newspapers and magazines, the delivery even of advertising matter are vital social and economic needs. A good many non-profit, "cause," educational, and opinion periodicals, including *The Nation*, would be severely injured if Mr. Donaldson should put through his 100 per cent increase in second-class mail rates.

Estes Kefauver

The Hoover Commission suggested specific measures for a sweeping reform of the Post Office Department. Some local offices, it pointed out, operate with great economy and efficiency, but their sound, managerial practices are not copied throughout the system. What the Post Office ought to be is an economically operated service system. Mr. Donaldson, although he is a career official with decades of experience in the department, shows no comprehension of such a goal. He seems to think that his job is to get along with Congress.

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Regimenting the Americas

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

Washington, March 30

UNLIKE other pan-American conferences, the current meeting in Washington is wasting no time on exhibitions of oratory. It was convoked at a time of emergency, when World War III seemed imminent, and although since then the international tension has somewhat diminished, it is nevertheless essentially a war conference. As such it is bound to be brief; though it has just opened, the closing date is set for April 6. Even the welcoming speeches—President Truman's on March 26 and Secretary Acheson's on the next day, at the first regular session—contained no superfluous rhetoric but were a direct call to the American republics to pool their resources to meet the threat of Soviet aggression.

President Truman declared, "We must concert our defenses and combine our strength in order to support men in Asia and Europe who are battling for freedom." Secretary Acheson confirmed the political character of the conference by presenting an eight-point plan which, in conjunction with military and economic measures to facilitate the coordinated defense of the hemisphere, suggested procedures "to deal with subversion and other forms of indirect aggression by the international Communist movement." Given the conflict of interests between the United States and the Latin American countries, the warm friendliness of "good neighbors" is likely to change to distrust and resentment as soon as economic problems are discussed. However, the chief business of the conference is not to settle economic questions; its disturbing political purpose is only too visible.

The peoples of Latin America who are under the heel of a dictator may have been stirred by President Truman's reference to "men battling for freedom in Asia and Europe," but they know that in large areas of this hemisphere they also face a fight for freedom. A glance at the men seated around the conference table shows how few represent democratic, progressive governments—notably the delegates from Mexico, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Ecuador. Among the others are the representatives of Perón, of Trujillo, of the Venezuelan military junta, of Odría, of Laureano Gómez, of the current dictator of Paraguay—but why go through the whole list? It would be absurd to pretend that these gentlemen came to the conference with any sincere desire to "save democracy." They are simply attending a routine meeting of a group of nations whose chief bond is geographical; there can be little in common and little sympathy between, say, a Perón of Argentina and a Martínez Trueba of Uruguay, close neighbors though they are.

The lack of an authentic community of ideals and purposes is the first great weakness of the Washington conference. Another is the disparity between the objectives of the United States and those of its southern neighbors—democrats and dictators alike. This disparity was made clear, without any beating about the bush, in the first speech by a Latin American, the reply of Foreign Minister Neves de Fontoura of Brazil to President Truman's address of welcome. (A comparable disparity between the objectives of the United States and those of its associates in the Atlantic Treaty Organization threatens the solidarity of that coalition.) The economy of the United States may be able to adjust itself to the impact of industrial mobilization, but this may prove fatal to the unstable economies of Latin America. The Brazilian Foreign Minister expressed the general fear of the countries represented at the conference that the United States, in the name of common defense, would again as in the last war induce them to expand production and then fail to protect them against subsequent contraction and inflation. To the listener his complaint tasted slightly of coffee. To come to Washington to "save democracy" may be for the dicators a joke, but to save themselves by lining up with Washington in exchange for substantial and lasting aid makes very good sense. They are eager to imitate the attempt of Franco, their model, to escape, with American help, from the financial crisis which is strangling his regime. They do not like some of Washington's suggestions, but they are hoping that the conference will assure them a long and safe political life like that enjoyed by the great Dominican "benefactor," General Trujillo. The common front against communism which they are asked to join under the direction of the United States represents for them and their heirs protection against the anger of their own people.

By the same token, for Latin American liberals the conference constitutes a very serious threat. I wrote to one of the most eminent of them to ask his opinion of the proposed new security front. His reply was as impressive as it was brief: "It is an act of homicide"—against freedom. In concrete terms what this implies is that a political refugee from Peru, seeking asylum in Colombia, will face identical repressive measures there. Denounced as a Communist by his own government, even if he is in fact only a liberal adversary of the dictator in power, he can find refuge nowhere; certainly not in the United States, where the McCarran law stands as an impassable barrier. For Americans this may be difficult to grasp. Here, though the hysteria is fantastic

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and few persons have the courage to defend those accused of subversive ideas, the law offers some protection: a hearing can be demanded, a suit for libel can be instituted. The accusers may even be smothered in ridicule if their victim is a respected personage whose views are well known. People would simply laugh if Harold L. Ickes, or Senator Paul Douglas, or President Conant of Harvard were called a Communist. But in Colombia former President Eduardo Santos, one of the greatest liberals of the continent and a moderate, middle-of-the-road statesman, has been denounced as a Communist by the lackeys of the pro-Franco dictator, Laureano Gómez.

While I am speaking of Colombia, I want to say a word about Señor Urdaneta Arbelaez, who in the last Assembly of the United Nations presided over the important Political Committee with shocking partiality, —but eloquently defended democracy and liberty outside Colombia. One of the delegates to the present conference told me that when Señor Arbelaez returned to his post of Minister of War, his first act was to order the population of the province of los Llanos to be evacuated under penalty of death. Aviators sprinkled the whole region with circulars which read: "Military forces of Colombia, National Army, Brigade of Military Institutes, Infantry Battalion No. 21, Vargas, Commander. This is to inform the worthy inhabitants of the region between Paratabueno and Tauramena that after March 8 the army is ordered to treat as outlaws all persons who by that date have not left the region. Two aviation squadrons are authorized to evacuate by air all who wish to leave." Those who stayed would simply be murdered!

It is known that among the aviators employed by Laureano Gómez to suppress the opposition to his rule are Falangist pilots from Spain, where the dictator spent a year learning how to defend a Christian civilization against subversive ideas. Proof of this has been provided in the course of a trial now going on in Venezuela to determine whether the Colombian guerrilla Chelito Velásquez, who fled to Venezuela and whose extradition is now demanded by Colombia, is a political refugee or an ordinary offender escaping justice.

THE stage is set for all issues to be harmoniously resolved. Three committees—on problems of defense, of internal security, of economic cooperation—will handle the various reports and proposals. In the military sphere the United States representative, on Wednesday, said it was "urgently" necessary for the Western Hemisphere to build up its strength to meet the Russian threat. The majority of the delegations agreed, but always on the assumption that they would not be expected to contribute troops—the Latin Americans gave enthusiastic approval to the U. N.'s toughest resolutions on Communist China but have sent very few soldiers to Korea. They are willing to perform some of the vital coastal-patrol duties which tied up 150,000 men and scores of ships and airplanes in the last war, provided this country bears most of the cost. It is reported that the United States offered $80,000,000 worth of arms, planes, and patrol vessels before the conference opened.

The Argentine delegation, for a number of reasons—including resentment at the condemnation of *La Prensa's* suppression and Perón's rage at the somewhat amused skepticism of the experts regarding the atomic discoveries of Argentine scientists—differed with the United States on the subject of defense. But it was not actuated solely by ill temper: a large section of the Argentine people is opposed to the Rio de Janeiro accord of December, 1948, the point of departure of the present discussions. It must not be forgotten that the Radical Party, which is the strongest anti-Perón group—in spite of its name it is as moderate as the similarly titled French party—has placed high on its program the "defense of the political, economic, and spiritual sovereignty of the country; *no* participation in political, economic, or military blocs." Dr. Arturo Frondisi, one of the most brilliant and combative members of the Radical Party, has declared in a published leaflet that his party's refusal to "accept the existence of aggressive military and economic blocs" is the basis of its opposition to the Rio pact.

Mexico, with the moral authority of a country which has defended the cause of international collaboration and peace ever since its great President, Lázaro Cárdenas, took his stand against the aggression of Mussolini in Ethiopia and of Mussolini and Hitler in Spain, believes that opinions on problems of defense may vary. In an important statement in *El Universal* of February 22, the very capable acting Foreign Minister of Mexico, Manuel Tello, said that though Mexico favored a solid American defense against possible aggression, it held to its pacifist and non-interventionist views, and that its acts in the United Nations bore out his words. This explains why the Mexican Foreign Minister on Thursday joined Argentina and Guatemala in opposing the United States proposals for Western Hemisphere defense. Acting from quite different motives Señor Tello took practically the same attitude as that expressed by Hipólito Jesús Paz, Argentine Foreign Minister, who declared that his government would not commit itself to sending its armed forces to fight outside the country, whether within the hemisphere or overseas on a United Nations mission.

The second committee, charged with studying internal security, faces no serious difficulties. In the first days of the conference the Foreign Minister of Guatemala, Señor Galich, humorously raised the question of the "representative democracy" in the charter of Bogotá. But this "impertinence" was waved aside, and the committee turned to the study of the measures which the different countries should take to combat communism.

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The task of the third committee is harder—to solve the problem of how the United States can use the economic resources of the Latin American countries in its war effort without dangerously unsettling their economies and creating a situation which would become disastrous when the war ended and they were left on their own. The potential wealth of the southern continent is extremely tempting to the United States. Few people in this country think of Latin America as anything but a picturesque place for a gay and exciting vacation; hardly anybody realizes that the thirteen South American countries contain proved deposits of metals sufficient to arm the Western Allies to the teeth. During the last war South and Central America and Mexico supplied all the United States' imports of antimony, bauxite, vanadium, and crude petroleum. One huge mineral mountain in Chile, the Chuquicamata, is estimated to contain a billion tons of ore which runs 2.16 per cent copper. Venezuela is the world's biggest exporter of crude petroleum, having produced 69,112,000 metric tons in 1949; and this source of supply has become invaluable since recent developments in Iran have threatened the West's control of the Middle Eastern oil fields. Peru is the greatest producer of vanadium, essential in the manufacture of steel. Argentina's output of wool, a war material of prime importance, is topped only by Australia's.

Development and use of these riches in accordance with such a plan as was outlined by Gunnar Myrdal in the U. N. Economic and Social Committee at Geneva would offer mankind the prospect of a beneficent peace as the alternative to a devastating war. Yet people are thinking only about how to pool these resources in the service of rearmament. The next few days will show whether the harmony which has so far prevailed in the conference will be shattered in the third committee. Latin American reluctance to yield to the demands of the United States will be supported by the revival of nationalism, which is gradually putting an end to that happy era—happy, that is, for foreign investors—when Latin American governments offered their country's natural resources to the highest bidder, and by the memories of the post-war period: a few boom years during the last war were followed by many more of economic crisis. As the Spanish song writer said: "Una cosa es el cariño y el dinero es otra cosa"—affection is one thing and money is another.


Anti-labour above all
TORY POWER-HUNGER
"What do we fire at now, Admiral?"
"EVERYTHING! Wossit matter what you fire at so long as you tear 'em up!"

C-I-C MISCHIEF

London *Daily Herald*

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Plus Ça Change . . .

BY ALEXANDER WERTH

Paris, March

THE "red belt" of Paris isn't all red: Saint-Denis and Ivry may be generally Communist, but Neuilly is almost solidly Gaullist, and Boulogne-Billancourt, despite its revolutionary reputation, is a little of everything. The town council, which meets in the luxurious *Mairie,* built in the early thirties, was elected in 1947 and consists of sixteen Gaullists, fifteen Communists, and six Socialists; the Mayor, M. Le Galle, is an old Socialist militant. At a recent meeting of the Council it was proposed that 100,000 francs ($275) be appropriated for gift parcels for the French troops in Indo-China. On the ground that "the best gift for them is to bring them home," the Communists voted against the proposal, which was carried by twenty-two votes to fifteen.

While Boulogne-Billancourt is part of Paris—one of the Métro lines runs right through it as far as the Sèvres Bridge—it looks different from Paris, as all the suburbs do. You notice the difference the moment you cross the old line of the *fortifs* at the Porte Saint-Cloud. The streets and houses are grubbier, the architectural tidiness of Paris suddenly disappears, and the buildings seem jumbled together any old way, blocks of modern flats alternating with dilapidated slums. There are more empty spaces in Boulogne-Billancourt than there were before the war, for 300 houses were destroyed in the three raids of '42 and '43. The 1942 raid was carried out by the R. A. F. and made a shambles of the Renault works, but the other two were high-altitude American raids, and the bombs fell all over the place, killing 2,000 people.

Of the 3,500 houses that were damaged, all have been repaired, but of the 300 totally destroyed, only a small number have been rebuilt. In what rebuilding goes on at present the bombed-out people—the *sinistrés*—get priority, but since rearmament began, the government housing grants, never adequate, have been cut down, and private enterprise is building nothing except some blocks of luxury flats, on which any rent whatsoever can be charged. "Ordinary" houses, with the maximum rents fixed at eleven to twelve times the pre-war level, are not a paying investment, since building costs are about twenty times as high as before the war.

This is one of the fundamental causes of the French housing shortage, which at Boulogne-Billancourt as elsewhere sometimes assumes both grotesque and tragic forms. One bombed-out person, soon after receiving a nice new flat, bought some furniture and then promptly sublet the place to an American for 35,000 francs a month. On the other hand, a Renault worker with whom I talked, a man making 25,000 francs a month, was living with his wife and four children in one small hotel room, for which he paid 7,000 francs a month. "Awful place," he said, "and full of Algerians, too." Since the man was a Communist, I thought his remark about the Algerians rather strange, almost "racialist," but he explained that it was a social rather than a racial question: a lot of the Algerians were uncouth, got drunk and carried knives. "It's not their fault. They are the result of a hundred years of colonial exploitation." But his wife was scared stiff of them for all that.

The Algerians are, indeed, a minor but still a nasty problem in the "red belt." At home they hear that it is easy to get rich in Paris, and since they are French citizens, there is nothing to stop them from coming here. Some learn a job and settle down respectably, perhaps marry a French girl; others become completely down and out in a short time. During the rubble-clearing scores of half-starved Algerians were found at Boulogne living in the ruins, and until a couple of years ago some parts of the district were dangerous at night, a whole little North African underworld having developed there since 1945. For a while the police had a tough time. However, a number of "North African hostels" are now being set up.

FOR most people Boulogne-Billancourt means the Renault works, one of the great centers of revolutionary ferment. But there are many small and medium engineering plants in the town, dozens of laundries—Boulogne's second "industry"—a shopkeeping class, and a large residential section adjoining the Bois de Boulogne; hence the heavy Gaullist vote. Since housing did not present a serious problem before the war, and since Louis Renault, one of the most autocratic of French industrialists, was not interested in social welfare, there are no "garden suburbs" surrounding the Renault works.

Today Renault is the largest and most successful automobile plant in France and, after Austin, the largest in Europe. It is also the only nationalized automobile plant in France. Its buildings, rather than its machinery, were badly wrecked by air raids, but thanks to the workers' enthusiasm and drive they were quickly restored after the Liberation, and with sixteen years as the average age of its machine tools—as against twenty in 1945—it ranks

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among the most modern of plants. After the war it imported thousands of machine tools from the United States, but it now makes its own. Foundries and a tire factory are attached to the Boulogne plant.

Louis Renault, who built his first car in 1898, was the sole owner of this vast concern before the war, but during the German invasion he was on a purchasing mission in the United States, and after the armistice he voluntarily returned to Paris and offered his services to the Germans. He died in prison after the Liberation, and the Renault works were nationalized and became the Régie Nationale des Usines Renault. The technical and engineering staffs were kept, and M. Lefaucheux, its director-general, boasts that "it's run precisely like a private firm," though under the orders of a "technocracy" instead of a capitalist boss. The state is the sole shareholder of Renault's, and last year it received a net profit of 350,000,000 francs ($1,000,000), which it "put back into the business." It pays taxes, and it is run on a strictly competitive basis. It turns out nearly three times as many cars as before the war.

Technically nationalization has been a great success. Whether it has been a success socially is much more debatable. Renault's is, in fact, an anomaly—a nationalized industry in a capitalist system which does not believe in the principle of nationalization. The Communist C. G. T., to which more than half the workers belong, and the Federation of Christian Trade Unions, which is second in importance, agree that "the spirit of the workers has greatly changed since 1947." Before then, with the Communists still in the government and the M. R. P. full of Socialist ideas, the workers were proud to think that the nationalization of Renault was a step toward socialism in France. The *Comité d'entreprise,* or Workers' Council, which aside from being an important advisory body is in charge of large funds used for social improvements among the workers, was very active up to 1947. Today it is scarcely on speaking terms with the management, which considers it a center of Communist political agitation, though the Christian trade unionists dispute this. As one of their leaders said to me, "The workers' share in running the Renault works is nothing like what it is in Germany. If the *Comité d'entreprise,* as the bosses say, used to be but is no longer 'loyal,' the change of attitude is quite understandable. We Christian trade unionists are also Socialists, and while at first the nationalization of Renault was a great hope, a source of real enthusiasm, we now know that Renault is just another factory, run on precisely the same lines as the rest."

In principle, everybody is free to say and think anything he likes outside the factory. But no politics are permitted inside. As I walked through the gigantic workshops, I was struck by two things—the lack of any inscriptions or slogans on the walls and the morose, concentrated, humorless look on all faces, whether French, Algerian, or Indo-Chinese. (For there are quite a number of Indo-Chinese working here, too. "Extremely quick on the uptake," one of the engineers remarked, "but not much good for heavy physical work.")

Another Christian trade unionist told me that in recent months disillusionment over the nationalization of Renault had gone a step farther: a good deal of nervousness, if not actual fear, was apparent among the workers, and not only among the Communists. The employees were afraid they might be classed as government servants and therefore be subjected to political purges like those at the Atomic Energy Center. "People who are not Communists," he said, "are often bound up with them by a *solidarité de travail,* and although in theory everybody is allowed to hold any political view he likes, the workers think it wise to keep their traps shut." The only political slogan I saw was painted on a wall opposite Renault's. It said, "Eisenhower, Go Home!"

Wages are just about the same as in the Paris engineering industry generally, perhaps a fraction better by virtue of an agreement reached by the management and the trade unions outside the C. G. T. in September. When the C. G. T. proved sticky, the management signed an agreement carrying a slight increase in pay with the other unions, the C. G. T. subscribing to it later, *faute de mieux.* Including bonuses and a traveling allowance, wages run from about 110 francs a hour for unskilled workers to 170 francs for highly skilled (30 to 50 cents), or from about $60 to $100 a month. Family allowances and social insurance increase the wage bill probably 40 per cent. In terms of purchasing power total wages are about 20 per cent lower than before the war. With the cost of living rising sharply the relative economic stability that was reached in the early part of 1950 is being rapidly destroyed. Owing chiefly to American rearmament, production costs are going up too—a matter that is causing the management of Renault considerable concern. How much shorter will rubber be? When will there be a strike?

The impoverishment of the French compared with pre-war days can be easily seen in the automobile statistics—which belie the impression created by the tremendous Paris traffic. In 1939 there were 1,817,000 private cars and 471,000 commercial vehicles; in 1949 the figures were 1,028,000 and 796,000. Before the war car owners were largely professional men, foremen, and highly skilled workers. These people can no longer afford cars. The buyers of new cars now are small business men and shopkeepers who include a car in their overheads. The great majority of Renault tractors are for export; only very large farms and estates can afford to use tractors owing to the abnormally high cost of gasoline. A modernized agriculture in France is another 1945 dream that has not come true.

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EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS

The Impasse in Iran

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

WE ARE discovering that world supplies of basic commodities are insufficient for a full-employment, semi-war economy. Indeed, they are inadequate for a full-employment peace economy, and if any progress is to be made in raising living standards, even moderately, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, much greater quantities of raw materials, particularly metals and fuels, will have to be made available. Thus whether the world's fate in the next decade is to be peace or war or a continuance of the present unresolved tensions, an expansion of mineral production is a matter of urgency.

The recent report to the President presented by the International Development Advisory Board, headed by Nelson Rockefeller, recognized this fact by urging that in the next few years two billion dollars be invested in the production of vital minerals to be found in underdeveloped regions. But how is so large a sum to be raised? The Rockefeller group suggested that it should be provided by private American investors working in partnership with local interests. But it is not going to be easy to interest large amounts of private capital in undertakings in which the usual commercial risks are supplemented by serious political risks of the kind that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is now experiencing as a result of the move by the Iranian Parliament to nationalize its properties.

The vast pools of petroleum in southwestern Iran have a tremendous significance for a world which is consuming more and more oil every year. And for Iran itself they represent potential capital which, properly employed, might help to raise that ancient land from its abysmal depths of poverty. But the extraction, processing, and marketing of oil is a business that requires both advanced technical skills and heavy outlays of capital. Fifty years ago, when a wealthy Englishman, William Knox D'Arcy, secured a sixty-year petroleum concession, Iran was entirely unequipped to exploit its resources: it could benefit from its suspected wealth of oil only by calling in foreign capital.

The early vicissitudes of the concessionaire illustrate some of the risks of a venture of this kind. It was not until 1908, after large sums had been spent on prospecting, that oil was struck in paying quantities; and four more years passed before the construction of a refinery at Abadan on the Persian Gulf, connected by pipe-line with the oil fields, enabled the Anglo-Persian Oil Company—the name was changed in 1935—to begin marketing operations.

Even then the enterprise was not too firmly established: it faced strongly intrenched competition, and it was short of capital. However, in 1914 the company signed a long-term contract for the supply of fuel oil to the British navy. Simultaneously, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, who distrusted the "internationalism" of the existing major oil concerns, persuaded the British Treasury to obtain a 52 per cent interest in Anglo-Persian at a cost of $10,000,000. The investment, which was bitterly opposed by conservative Britons as "socialistic," paid off handsomely. The navy obtained an assured supply of oil at less than world prices—it enjoys a sliding-scale discount linked to the volume of company profits—and the Treasury has received dividends covering its outlay many times over.

It is not recorded that the Iranian government was consulted before control of its concession passed to a great power, or that it protested. After all, at that time Britain and Russia were allies and had "settled" the Persian question by carving the country into spheres of interest. Tehran had little to say, and until 1932 appeared to be content with the 16 per cent share of net profits which it received under the original concession.

By that time Iran had acquired a "strong man," the upstart Reza Shah Pahlevi, who had large and expensive ideas about modernizing his country. Noting that his oil revenues were shrinking because the world-wide depression had reduced the demand for oil and Anglo-Iranian's profits had declined, he canceled the concession. This action provoked Britain to diplomatic protests and an appeal to the League of Nations, but the company continued to operate, and after months of hard bargaining a new agreement was signed. The period of the concession was extended until 1993, but its area was reduced from 500,000 to 100,000 square miles. Provision was made for payment of four (gold) shillings per ton royalty to the Iranian government, plus 20 per cent of all profits distributed to shareholders, whether from earnings or reserve, in excess of the amount needed to pay 5 per cent on the common stock.

WITH peace between government and company restored and the depression receding, production and profits once more began to expand. The outbreak of World War II brought a temporary reversal, but after 1941 the demands of the Allied armies taxed the company's resources even though output in 1945 reached 17,000,000 tons, compared with 9,500,000 in 1939.

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But although Iran's oil revenues have steadily increased—they provide about 15 per cent of the government's total income—dissatisfaction with the 1933 agreement has mounted. There are many grounds for complaint, as Walter J. Levy pointed out in an illuminating and objective discussion of the problem which appeared in the *Oil Forum's* February issue. The government felt that it was still receiving too small a share of the company's fat earnings. It compared its receipts of about one-third of the company's trading profits with the 50 per cent cut the Venezuelan government has been receiving from foreign oil companies; it took a dim view of the fact that the British government was collecting from the company much larger sums—over half the trading profit in 1949—in direct taxation.

Among other causes of complaint were the special terms on which the British navy continued to buy oil, the relatively high prices charged by the company inside Iran, neglect of natural gas and by-products which might assist industrialization, and labor policies, including the employment of too high a percentage of foreigners and failure to train Iranians for key posts. Not all these criticisms were valid. In Iranian terms, for instance, the company is undoubtedly a model employer, paying good wages, maintaining excellent health services, and providing extensive technical-training facilities. On the other hand, it might have done more to insure that oil was both cheap and readily available to Iranians. Granted that geography and low living standards make for high distribution costs, and mean that at best per capita consumption will be small, the company would have been wise to remove this cause of dissatisfaction even though local operations resulted in a loss. Actually the supplemental agreement signed by the company and the Iranian government in July, 1949, provides for the local sale of oil at 25 per cent below world prices instead of 10 per cent as heretofore.

The main purpose of this supplemental agreement was to increase government revenue. It provided for raising the tonnage royalty from four to six shillings and for somewhat larger tonnage payments in lieu of taxes. In addition the company undertook to pay the government 20 per cent of the accumulated reserve as at the end of 1947 and a similar proportion of all future allocations to this reserve, thus meeting the objection that Iran had been adversely affected by Britain's dividend freeze. The increased royalty and tax payments were also to be retroactive to January 1, 1948, and if the new agreement had been ratified, the Iranian Treasury would have received by the end of 1950 an extra sum of nearly $100,000,000—enough to have solved the worst of its financial difficulties.

Nevertheless, the agreement seemed to Iranians to compare unfavorably with Venezuelan arrangements. They failed to take into consideration the fact that it gave Iran a share in the profits which Anglo-Iranian derives from its growing production in Kuwait and other outside fields and also in the earnings of its world-wide marketing organization, which extends right to the filling-station level. By contrast, the big foreign oil concerns in Venezuela, as well as Aramco, which has recently signed a fifty-fifty agreement with Saudi Arabia, sell their oil at the water's edge, mostly to affiliated companies, and do not receive profits from distribution. Thus it is not easy to compare the terms now offered to Iran and those enjoyed by other oil-rich nations.

IN ANY case the equity of the supplemental agreement is largely beside the point. The real difficulty is that a great many Iranians view the company as a monster. It has grown so large, so rich, and so seemingly powerful that it dominates the country. Appearing almost a state within a state, it offers a constant affront to national pride. Moreover, as a correspondent of the London *Times* wrote, "the inner tension of Persian society has now become such that it can be met only by an acceleration of the drive against the external scapegoats."

Well-informed Iranians readily admit that their country is not equipped to operate the company's intricate business without external help. But calculations of economic advantage have been overwhelmed by nationalist sentiment, which in turn has been manipulated by political opportunists. In the Majlis (Parliament) it was a combination of right- and left-wingers that forced the government to withdraw the supplemental agreement last December and a few weeks ago, following the assassination of Premier Ali Razmara, voted nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian's properties. The left, which sees the company as the natural ally of reaction and therefore an enemy to reform, includes elements taking a lead from Moscow which would be delighted to deny Iranian oil to the West. On the right some members were frightened into voting for nationalization by the threats of nationalist extremists; others, representing the corrupt, conservative landowners, sought to curb the reforming tendencies of the young Shah, whose plans would have been aided by the larger revenues from the supplemental agreement.

The Shah of Persia

What next? A committee of the Majlis is now study-

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ing ways and means of taking over the company. If it carries on its researches at all objectively, it is likely to find almost insuperable obstacles. Iranian technicians, aided by independent foreign engineers, might be able to operate the oil fields and refineries, but how would the problem of selling the oil be solved? Iran cannot take over the company's huge tanker fleet and marketing organization: it would require years and a vast investment to build a pipe-line over two great mountain ranges to the Caspian, and then Russia, as the only buyer at the end of the line, would be in a position to dictate prices.

So far the Anglo-Iranian directors seem to have remained calm. They hope that, as in 1932, nationalist passions will cool, making possible new negotiations. In this event they might agree to segregate their Iranian properties in the hands of a separate company in which Iran would be given a 50 per cent interest and a share in the management—that is to say, a genuine partnership. No less generous offer is likely to soothe Iranian pride, and the British government, which is in a weak position to object on principle to nationalization, would be wise to use its control of the company to promote a compromise on these lines.

Rearmament's Rising Tempo

BY FRITZ STERNBERG

IN 1951 the American economy—and American history—entered a new phase. We have had war economies and peace economies, but never before an armament economy in time of peace, at least never one of such magnitude as that under which we are now operating. Only its first small beginnings were apparent in the second half of 1950, when military expenditures amounted to 7 per cent of the American national income; by the end of 1952 they are expected to have risen to 18 per cent.*

Nor have the European democracies ever had an armament economy in peace time of the scale planned by the United States for the next few years. Their extensive military preparations before the First World War did not extend to the industrial, or economic, sphere. Governments did not then realize in what measure a future war would be fought by the munitions plants. Actual military expenditures were therefore small compared with today. In 1913, the last year before World War I, military expenditures even in Germany were only 4 per cent of the total national income.

Nor was the situation much different in the democratic countries before World War II. In Great Britain the military budget was only 4 per cent of the maximum war-time military expenditures (1943-44), and in France matters were no different. Before World War II Nazi Germany alone had a peace-time armament economy until the Soviet Union responded in kind.

That the present American armament economy entails numerous errors and a good deal of friction is due not least to the fact that the past offers no direct parallel, that we cannot profit from experience. Of course we can draw to some extent on our experiences in World War II, when the peace economy was transformed into a war economy, but expenditures then reached dimensions not approached by the armament production of today. In terms of 1950 prices our military expenditures in 1944 would have amounted to no less than $135,000,000,000 a year—many times the military budget planned for the end of 1952. In 1940, however, they were far below those of 1950. The accompanying chart shows the tremendous rise from 1940 to 1944 and the much smaller planned rise between 1950 and 1952.



But it is not merely the lesser scope that distinguishes today's armament economy from the war economy of seven years ago. The expansion of production

*Unless otherwise noted, all figures given in this article were taken from The Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the Congress, January, 1951.

FRITZ STERNBERG, distinguished economist, will bring out a new book this spring—"Socialism and Capitalism on Trial." In a second article he will analyze the influence of the rearmament economy on the American and European standards of living.

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has a different economic and social basis. The New Deal had determined the development of the American economy for many years up to the time of Lend-Lease; not until the United States was in the war did Roosevelt declare that Dr. New Deal would have to be replaced by Dr. Win-the-War. America entered World War II with eight to ten million unemployed and a latent crisis. The fact that this crisis could not be completely liquidated in peace time had considerably shaken the confidence of big business in its own strength, and it was quite a while before this confidence was regained. Big business had no particular interest in building new plants and raising productive capacity, since for some time it had been unable to exploit fully the existing industrial facilities. Because industry was unwilling to assume the costs of expanding production, "nearly 72 per cent of the total war-industrial facilities of the period were built with public funds."

The war gradually changed the attitude of the industrialists. The more they were needed for the required tremendous expansion of production, the more they penetrated into the Roosevelt Administration. In the post-war period their power increased. Today Dr. Fair Deal has been replaced by Dr. Win-the-War even before we have a war.

The tremendous industrial expansion of the war years caused the number of persons employed in manufacturing industries to increase for the first time in decades. Between 1919 and 1929 the productivity of labor had risen so much that in 1929 the number of workers was no greater than it had been in 1919. During the depression the number of course declined, and the 1929 level could not be reached again under the New Deal. In 1939 the figure was 10,078,000, or nearly half a million below that of 1929. When the war began, the number of employed industrial workers started to rise, reaching its peak in 1943 with 17,381,000.

At the close of hostilities the number dropped, though it remained much higher than it had been before the war. From 15,247,000 in 1947 it declined to 14,146,000 in 1949 and then rose again to 15,487,000 in the second half of 1950. Even before the big rearmament phase it was thus about 50 per cent above the pre-war level. With the now definitely expected rise in industrial output, it will undoubtedly reach its war-time peak again.

THE confidence of big business that prosperity will last for a long time will probably be justified. The armament economy requires enormous new investments. Since the war new investments have been made almost exclusively by private enterprise, and that trend will undoubtedly continue.

The chart on the next column, showing the industrial output of the last ten years, indicates the probable trend of industrial developments.

The Report says:


INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
Total industrial output rose about 90 percent from 1940 to the wartime peak in 1943, when it was very heavily weighted by munitions production. During 1950, although below the wartime peak, it was 60 percent above the 1940 level, and was rising rapidly.
POINTS IN TOTAL INDEX
POINTS IN TOTAL INDEX
1935-39 AVERAGE FOR TOTAL = 100
TOTAL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
MINERALS
TOTAL MANUFACTURES
NONDURABLE MANUFACTURES
DURABLE MANUFACTURES
250
200
150
100
50
0
1940 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
SOURCE: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM.

From a 1943 peak of 239, the index of industrial production fell to 170 in 1946; or by nearly 30 per cent. Since 1946, except for the 1949 setback, the index has climbed steadily, and by the end of 1950 was within 10 per cent of its war-time peak. Except for the industries which had concentrated on munitions production, virtually all types of industrial output at the end of 1950 were substantially above war-time peaks. In view of the record of expansion and modernization of industrial facilities during the post-war years, basic industrial capacity is now well above the 1944 level.

Starting from this high level a further steep rise of industrial output can be expected. To give but one example: it is planned to raise American steel production from the present 103,000,000 tons a year to about 120,000,000 tons by 1953-54, chiefly through new investments to be made by private enterprise.

The relative industrial strength of the United States in the present world economy is well illustrated by steel. Its output of about 100,000,000 tons of steel a year is already three to four times that of Russia and its satellite states, which is estimated at 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 tons. An increase of 17,000,000 tons in the American output would be an increase equal to more than half the total steel production of Russia and its empire; 17,000,000 tons is more than Britain's entire steel output (the new American arms budget about equals Britain's total national income); it is about 50 per cent more than Germany's present steel production of 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 tons and more than Germany's total capacity. An American steel output of 120,000,000 tons would surpass by one-third the total production of Russia and its satellites, plus Britain and Western Europe.

Incidentally, it should be pointed out that these plans for a 17,000,000-ton expansion of steel production are based on the assumption that there will be no war with Russia in 1951-52. The Report says:

> The finished steel requirements for the expansion would total three to four million tons. . . . If total war in 1951 were regarded as inevitable, it would prob-

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ably be an inefficient use of resources to start further substantial increases in steel capacity now. It would be better, under that assumption, to use the available steel for making weapons instead of for building more capacity.

Even the beginnings of the armament economy have affected the economic relations of the United States with other countries. "For 1950 as a whole," according to the Census Bureau, "exports amounted to $10,274,800,000 and were $1,435,000,000 in excess of imports. Exports last year were 15 per cent below the 1949 level, while imports recorded a gain of 35 per cent." Thus the dollar gap is being substantially reduced. Other economic difficulties of the countries of Western Europe, however, will not be alleviated by our armament economy but will actually be intensified, as I shall show in a later article.

The dwindling American export surplus is clearly represented in the following chart:



E. C. A.'s Blunders in Italy

BY MARIO ROSSI

FOR many years the American taxpayer has contributed a share of his income to the recovery of Europe, of which Italy is politically and strategically an important part. Has Italy invested this money wisely and constructively? Is its economy on the way to permanent recovery? And above all has Italy taken the measures needed to deal with the problem of unemployment, the solution of which is the condition of stability, economic and political?

Italy today has 2,000,000 jobless, 10 per cent of its labor force. This is the highest proportion in Europe, east or west, and more than double what it was in the Fascist period. The old ways of coping with the problem cannot be applied any longer. Before Fascism, overpopulation was kept in check by mass emigration to the Americas. Today no foreign country seems willing to absorb Italian labor. Fascism kept unemployment down by armament and public-works programs. Today the rearmament program in which Italy will engage with the other Atlantic Pact nations may somewhat relieve unemployment, but the price will again be inflation and a lowered standard of living.

Some wishful thinkers have proposed birth control as a solution for over-population. Apart from the fact that this would be a "long-term" solution, since the labor market would not begin to feel its influence for at least twenty years, Italy's birth rate is already one of the lowest in Europe. It is the same as France's and considerably lower than that of the United States.

Conditions in Italy have changed more radically since the end of the war than people in America realize. The people no longer believe in the inevitability of unemployment. The leftist parties have in consequence acquired great strength and have convinced the masses that social and economic reforms could better their lot. The change in the psychology of the southern peasants, once servile and fatalistic as Arab fellahs, is shown by their seizure of uncultivated lands.

The Italian government is trying to handle the situation by resuming an economic policy adopted some sixty years ago, a policy sound then but disastrous today. Its aim is to balance the budget and "defend" the lira, which of course seems excellent to those who have lire to defend. Once this is done, the government maintains, private enterprise will take care of all other social and economic problems. And if in the meantime unemployment causes unrest, that is a police problem and must be dealt with as such. Coming from Christian Democrats, this solution shows very little Christian charity and even less democratic spirit.

The E. C. A. mission in Italy has proposed a different approach. Leon Dayton, its head, told the Italian government, in language which drew a threat of resignation from De Gasperi, that full employment must be Italy's first goal. Penny-pinching to balance the budget

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was ruinous. The government should engage in an aggressive and well-planned policy of investments that would expand production and create new possibilities of work. The E. C. A.'s 1949 report said:

> The total level of capital-goods production is far below what would be possible with present supplies of raw materials, power, and labor. . . . It would appear that the Italian government has little to fear from an aggressive public-investment program provided it plans carefully and in advance for possible contingencies. Clearly, the continued under-utilization of a considerable part of industrial capacity [about 50 per cent!] is inconsistent with the objectives of the recovery program and will not contribute to a solution of Italy's fundamental employment problem.

These findings were confirmed by the report published in March, 1950, which pointed out that with productivity still far below pre-war levels, costs remained high and sales in both domestic and foreign markets were restricted.

A PROGRAM of extended production, however, encounters two obstacles: (1) Italy is very poor in natural resources; (2) the average per capita income is so low that little remains for investment after everyday needs have been satisfied.

Italy must acquire most of its raw materials abroad. It must therefore have foreign exchange, which in turn is dependent on exports. And so far Italy has been unable to export enough at prices which are competitive in world markets. Italy's production costs are much higher than those of most other industrial nations, as is shown by the international balance of payments. While 35 per cent of Italy's total imports were from the United States, only 6 per cent of its exports went to the United States. Obviously, Italy cannot sell in the American market, where it must buy its raw materials.

Western Europe and Latin America took 62 per cent of Italy's exports but furnished only 37 per cent of its imports. This trade was made possible by Italy's large credits in Western European and Latin American countries, which were set up in order to get rid of products that could not be sold more profitably on other markets. These exports actually represent a loss and a further lowering of the national income, for if non-dollar credits remain idle, the government has to pay the equivalent lire to exporters. In 1948 the Bank of Italy had to advance $270,000,000 to finance exports. "Shall we, asked *La Voce Repubblicana,* official organ of the Republican Party, which is represented in the Cabinet, "continue the policy of making presents of credit to the whole world? And shall we go on forcing the Italian consumer to pay for it, whose standard of living is the lowest among Marshall Plan countries?" The situation has become so absurd that an Italian official proposed to use credits in France to build houses for French workers. "It is true," he said, "that we have millions of homeless, but otherwise what are we going to do with our credits in French francs?"

Obviously, it would be silly for Italy to produce more goods to sell to countries which have no raw materials to offer in return. An increase in production must be accompanied by a sharp cut in production costs which will make it possible for Italian goods to compete in hard-currency markets. But this cannot be accomplished without a reorganization of Italian industry.

Prime Minister de Gasperi

Swiss industry when first developed faced much the same problem, though on a more limited scale. Like Italy, Switzerland has few natural resources and an abundant labor force. Unlike Italy, it solved the problem wisely by manufacturing watches and other precision instruments which require small amounts of raw materials and much skilled labor. Italy, afflicted by the *manie de grandeur,* chose to create a large mechanized industry worthy of a great power. The E. C. A. report says:

> During the 1920's and 1930's Italian industry grew under the haphazard direction of the Fascist state without the healthy selection imposed by competition. Autarchic policies prevented foreign competition, and the small size of the domestic market tended to make such an industry highly monopolistic. Heavy industries, such as the armament industry and shipbuilding, grew rapidly and uneconomically during World War I and were protected during the inter-war years from competition which might have stimulated needed reorganization and rationalization.

IN OTHER words, Italy's heavy industry is uneconomical and parasitic; it is supported by government subsidies and favors but has not the benefit of the planning that a socialist economy would supply. With respect to the degree of state participation in many key sectors, either through direct ownership of certain industries or through parasitical holding companies, the E. C. A. report noted, "State-controlled mechanical and engineering industries . . . comprise one-third of the output of medium and large plants in the field." This statement

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could convey the impression that a large segment of Italian industry is nationalized. The report dispels any such thought:

> For a very large part of such enterprises the Italian government merely provides a certain amount of financial backing and risk-taking while participating passively or scarcely at all in managerial decisions. In a large number of such enterprises little effort is being made by the government to achieve greater efficiency through modernization and reorganization. Quasi-nationalized industries are not used as pace-setters for privately owned establishments in the same field. The state-controlled enterprises are by no means used as tools of governmental economic policy but now serve rather to aggravate the rigidities which plague the Italian economy; in some cases marginal production units which would have disappeared in a normal competitive situation continue to exist because of financial support from the Italian state. Lacking the incentive of private enterprise and free competition, for which the present passive managerial role of the state provides no substitute, certain segments of these state-controlled industries have ceased to develop or now improve at a snail's pace.

To put it simply, the state subsidizes a large number of industries but has no control over them, with the result, according to the latest E. C. A. data, that they are at present running at between 25 and 50 per cent of capacity. Is it to be wondered, then, that the owner cares little about production, knowing that the government will cover his deficit? This attitude has developed a special type of industrialist whose worry is not to produce the most at the lowest possible price in order to beat his competitors but how to win favors in Rome. He uses bribery, buys newspapers to influence public opinion, places his men in Parliament and in key posts in the civil service. He regularly extorts subsidies by threatening to close his factory; the government surrenders to his request rather than risk more unemployment and unrest. Industrialists of this type have acquired such power in Rome that they practically run the country.

Italian plants must be modernized to reduce costs, most of the machinery being fifteen to twenty-five years old; production processes must be streamlined; surplus labor must be diverted to other activities; turnover taxes must be reduced. But none of these things can be accomplished unless Italy follows the example of England and France and nationalizes its main industries. Only if this is done can big business be prevented from strangling the medium and small enterprises, which are vital to Italian recovery, and the public be assured that the national income will be invested to safeguard the interests of the country, not those of a few individuals.

Expansion of Italy's home market will be difficult unless the people's standard of living can be raised. According to the Association of Italian Joint Stock Companies, "the per capita income obtained in 1949 is not only 10 per cent below that of 1938 but 10 per cent below that enjoyed by Italians in 1913, forty years ago." A recent U. N. survey shows that in 1949 the average income in Italy was $235 as compared with $1,453 in the United States, $773 in Great Britain, and $482 in France.

I SHALL not dwell here on the extreme poverty of the mainly agricultural south or the urgent need of agrarian reform, to which the government of Prime Minister de Gasperi is solemnly committed, with the full support of E. C. A., but about which nothing has been done. A land reform would not directly affect unemployment. Fifty per cent of Italy's labor force is now engaged in agriculture, and it is unlikely that the tired soil of Italy could use more hands. But, indirectly, by improving the subhuman existence of the peasants, agrarian reform would help tremendously in absorbing an expanded industrial output. A fairer income would create new needs —from kitchen utensils to bathtubs, from furniture to radios and cars. Not only would the northern industries acquire a new market in the south, but subsidiary industries would be created there, and commerce, tourism, and shipping would be aided. If a long-promised housing project could also be carried out, thousands of small and medium-size industries would be activated. The Italian government cannot say that the necessary funds are lacking. It could use the "lira fund" to finance this project. But we read in the New York *Times*:

> Officials of the Marshall Plan agency are particularly disheartened by the slow rate at which lire accumulated in the European Recovery Program counterpart fund are being spent. In the two fiscal years from July 1, 1948, to June 30, 1950, the agency authorized the use of $464,500,000, but only $88,700,000 were withdrawn from the fund, and there is reason to believe that the whole of this sum has not been spent. During the last fiscal year authorizations amounted to $350,000,000 and withdrawals to $145,000,000.

E. C. A. drafts all kind of plans and projects, but the Italian government pays no attention. Yet the government is at least consistent. It proclaims undivided allegiance to free enterprise, Italian style, and follows that line, however ruinous the result. Unfortunately, by trying to introduce a New Deal without laying the foundations for it, E. C. A., however unintentionally, is strengthening an economic structure that is the cause of the Italian people's poverty and unhappiness. E. C. A. has not yet understood, or does not wish to understand, that the realization of its own program for Italy calls for the nationalization of major industries and a sweeping land reform. But even if E. C. A. did advocate these changes as the indispensable condition of lasting Italian recovery, the present ruling class would never allow them. Italy's economic problem thus becomes one of men and political orientation.

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

Father and Daughter

THE TOLSTOY HOME. Diaries of Tatiana Sukhotin-Tolstoy. Translated by Alec Brown. Columbia University Press. $4.

LEO TOLSTOY'S oldest daughter, Tatiana, now a woman of eighty-seven, has published the diaries which she wrote between the ages of fourteen and forty-seven. To call her story honest is not enough. On the one hand it contains the contradictions and bright flashes of the best conversation; on the other, it lays bare her soul. The book is only incidentally a description of the Tolstoy home. Primarily it is the emotional record of an extraordinary young woman and her relations with her extraordinary father. This is Tatiana's second appearance before an English-speaking audience. In 1925 she made a speech in Prague (summarized in *Living Age*), in which she interpreted the parental tragedy. Her words were wise and compassionate. Although the daughter spoke to offset her mother's slanderers, she also established herself as the worthy heir of Leo Tolstoy.

Tatiana Sukhotin-Tolstoy, who lived all her life as the oldest daughter of a great man, can now be understood in her own right. A youthful photograph of her appears in the book. She is dressed in plain, tight-fitting velvet, lace at the cuffs, ribbon at the neck, head bent over a note, with a flower on her little table and papers strewn happily over the floor. A half-smile warms her face, suggesting a love note. In short, she seems another Anna Karenina, made to be loved. And so her diaries reveal her.

When they begin in 1878, with Tania a fourteen-year-old adolescent, her father's religious search has not yet interrupted her development; she dreams of her social debut in Moscow. "Papa" is her hero and fun-loving Aunt Tatiana her "kind fairy." Between flirtations she sketches; and the many babies of the household fall into her waiting arms. She is adorable and well aware of the fact; neither parent can resist her, and her life promises to be a fortunate one.

But the family move to Moscow, in 1882, made the discord of the parents clear to their older children. Tania, however, overflowed with life, her social needs not unlike those of her still charming mother. And so while the father studied Moscow poverty, the daughter paid 1,500 rubles for her season's frocks. She could not follow Tolstoy blindly as her sister Masha did, but her father was still first in her affections ("the only man whom I believe always . . . my sole consolation and support in life"), and she was jealous of Masha. When "The Kreutzer Sonata" appeared, with its declaration in favor of celibacy, beautiful Tania renounced marriage. And so she who was ready for married love and for children remained a coquette, like her mother, and also fought against her passions, like her father. With great caution Tatiana finally married at the age of thirty-four, never before having exchanged a kiss, and found to her surprise that married love could provide a basis for happiness. Four stillborn babies followed, until at the age of forty-one she had a little girl who lived, her only child. This part of Tatiana's life, the main story, is full of grief, and the diarist does not seek to minimize it.

But Tania had another role to play, that of family consoler. In age she stood midway between her mother and her mother's youngest child—a twenty-year span in each direction—and she became her mother's assistant and confidante. In spite of the magnetism of her father ("My love for him is an unconquerable rival to all my other loves") she felt that her mother's isolation was tragic and instead of judging her pitied her. It was Tania who realized the error of her father's written will, Tania who tried to bring her father and mother together during the last days of illness. The explanation of the family discord, in so far as it is recorded in this diary, represents the Countess in terms which ring true and are also sympathetic. The daughter's record balances the partial accounts of her parents.

The reader wonders whether Tatiana resented her fate: that her young love was demanded and used by her father and that much of her life was absorbed in family reconciliation. A strange entry occurs in 1901, after her marriage, during a stay with her parents in the Crimea. Tatiana has just given birth to her first stillborn child, her father is very ill, and her husband complains of his heart condition, but she is most aware of her own misery. She writes about her father: "Must not forget to be a companion to him. Must not forget that he might die. Must not forget one has to forgive . . ." Does the word "forgive" refer to her long years of unused love and to her mounting fear that she will never have children of her own? But this is only one entry amid others of a different tone. The interesting fact is that Tatiana, the daughter who capitulated least to her father, remained no less dear to him for that reason. She did not renounce her property in 1891, knowing full well that she could not curb her expenditures. "The dark people," Tolstoy's disciples, often seemed to her ridiculous, sick, and even unbalanced, and she never felt comfortable with the Chertkovs, who married for principle.

In art Tatiana was moved less by "noble content" than by beauty. Tolstoy loved this daughter for her charm and her independent outlook. He trusted her judgment and was grateful that she stayed close to her mother. Father and daughter remained shy with each other —Tania could not caress Tolstoy as Masha did—but they read each other's hearts. Tatiana, like her mother, would not have chosen a life separated from Leo Tolstoy, in spite of the sacrifices she paid for his companionship. In 1889 she writes, "I so appreciate having been born precisely in this family, with Papa as my father." And after Tolstoy's death she deifies him, capitalizing the pronouns which refer to him, and hoping for his second coming. "I do dream of Tania [the daughter] bearing a son who will continue the great work of his great grandfather."

ANITA MARBURG

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Why Wars Come

AND THE WAR CAME. The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861. By Kenneth M. Stampp. Louisiana State University Press. $4.50.

THIS brilliant and scholarly volume is much more than a reexamination of the immediate coming of the Civil War; it is a balanced and wise analysis of why wars come. Quite possibly the author, an associate professor of history at the University of California, did not intend his study to be read as a general critique of such a timely problem. Nevertheless, his insights are so shrewd and his analysis of the problem so deft that the reader cannot help making Professor Stampp's unpretentious work do double duty. The author sweeps aside the dry rot of partisan historical theorizing—he is not gallant Southerner, or Doughface, or Yankee—and drives fast to that hard core of meaning the period of the secession crisis holds for us. His insight into the dynamics of that period may well serve as a guide to studies of similar crises of our own and other times.

Propaganda, the distortions of reality perpetrated by hotheads and fanatics North and South: these are frequently claimed as causes of the Civil War. Overemphasis on the power of the images and stereotypes contrived in order to *intensify* the sectional conflict has led some historians to claim that propagandists and their techniques *created* the conflict. Professor Stampp, however, evinces a more realistic understanding of the role played by the agitators in the North. All wars require a molding of attitudes that conceive of the enemy as an ogre; this was the task performed all too well by the agitators. When war did come, Northern leaders could more easily make of it a great crusade against Southerners stereotyped as cruel, rapacious, godless, and immoral slave breeders.

The author by no means denies the importance of the agitators. But with an all too rare capacity for balance, he recognizes that beneath and beyond the propaganda there was, in reality, sectional rivalry and conflict. He does not forget, as some historians do, that there remained the fact of Negro slavery. The South was a static, agrarian, debtor society, for decades at bitter odds with its creditor, the dynamic, commercialized, and rapidly industrializing North. Again and again the sections had clashed on matters vital to each—internal improvements, tariffs, subsidies, and national banks. "These matters," Professor Stampp wisely reminds us, "together with slavery, were always back of the tirades of the agitators. And these matters, rather than the tirades, were at the roots of things. Without them there would have been no sectional agitation and no Civil War."

Nor did the war come because the Americans of the secession crisis were a "blundering generation"; Professor Stampp abundantly demonstrates that the North chose rather than blundered into its course. Conciliation failed in this last crisis not because of ineptitude but because the North had determined what its interests were and, when they were at stake, refused to make those compromises necessary to prevent war. Similarly, of course, the South refused meaningful compromise when its basic interests were threatened.

War came when Lincoln, heeding the incessant demands of the North, refused to accept compromises satisfactory to the South, pursued his intended course of "enforcing the laws," and stood firm against the evacuation of Fort Sumter. It has been charged, more covertly than otherwise, that Lincoln "caused" the war by his maneuvering at Sumter, and that his decision to send an expedition to the beleaguered fort not only precipitated the war but was actually consciously planned to do so in order to take the new President and his party out of an untenable position. With refreshing realism Professor Stampp does not defend or attack Lincoln for his actions. Rather he indicates how consistent they were with the avowed position Lincoln and his party had long since insisted must be taken if the Union were to be preserved. Lincoln's was a "strategy of defense" at Sumter. Given the unwillingness of both sections to make those concessions that alone would avoid war, maneuvering the South into the position of "aggressor" if war should come was superb strategy. And the author's appraisal of Sumter as strategy and not blunder does not lead him to accuse Lincoln of self-seeking and partisanship. Instead, he is correctly aware that it may well have been but Lincoln's great good fortune that "personal, partisan, and national interests could be served with such favorable coincidence as they were by his Sumter decision."

But the war wasn't necessary or "inevitable," as wars never have been nor ever will be. Bitterness, antagonism, and conflict—between societies whose economic, political, and cultural patterns were so opposed—surely were irrepressible. To assume, however, that war had to come is folly and serves only to relieve Lincoln's generation, North and South, of responsibility for its choice of war to resolve conflict. Probably we judge the past as we would have posterity judge us. Thus "inevitability" relieves our generation, East and West, of responsibility for its choice of war or peace. Worse, the fatalism that denies choice may effectually prevent those who truly abhor war from making meaningful efforts toward peace—and may aid those who would justify as "inevitable" the easy use of war to secure their ends.

Historians would serve us well not to explain away but rather to examine carefully the choices of war or peace for which other generations are responsible. Thoroughly, without partisanship, and with a keen intelligence Professor Stampp has done this for us. His volume deserves the widest attention.

RICHARD D. HEFFNER

Verse-Dramas

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS. By Kenneth Rexroth. New Directions. $1.50.

PLAYS by poets are works to be regarded with mistrust: not because one has any protective concern for the theater (like most Americans who are separated spiritually—and geographically—from the New York stage, I know little and—*in flagrante delicto!*—care little about the affairs of the dramatist) but rather because one has observed repeatedly that, in spite of the obsessive interest in the drama which has appeared in the practice and criticism of the followers of Yeats, Eliot, Pound, and even Bridges, most modern poets go haywire when they try to write speeches for other people to recite. It is an uncommon pleasure to report that Kenneth Rexroth has managed to com-

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pose verse-dramas that are as well written as his lyrics.

This volume contains four plays—"Phaedra," "Iphigenia at Aulis," "Hermaios," "Berenike." They are short: I suppose they can be called "one-act plays," though in a negative way this does some violence to Rexroth's structural method, which makes plays that are whole, flowing, and "unscenic," like good lyrics. As the titles indicate, the situations in these plays are derived from Greek antiquity, the first two from standard mythology, the last two, which are related sequentially, from Rexroth's imagined re-creation of a historical episode. The motivating idea of all these plays is the same—the struggle of the individual to transcend the web of events through strength of will or purity of love or the euphoria of acceptance. The action is plain and often ugly; dramatic tension comes from the simplest conflicts of sex. The compulsion of circumstance, the unity of cause and effect, the intimacy of the family of mankind, whose interdependent acts fill time, are conveyed by a controlling order of incest. These are Greek plays: the gods are incestuous, for they have only themselves. So must heroes be; so must men.

The statement that the lines of these dramas are as well written as those of Rexroth's lyric poems does not constitute unqualified praise. In both there is a tendency toward unfinished figures which avoids the first rule of good writing: that is, describe everything absolutely faithfully. Thus in the first lines of the first play we find a description of the wind rising "With an uncanny rustling/Noise like stiff pleated tissues/Moving." There are many kinds of tissue, several kinds of stiffness. Dress, arras, tarpaulin? Silk, burlap, canvas? The wind is making almost any sort of noise, and we cannot hear it. Such imprecision is common in these plays. On the other hand, Rexroth has made a line that is flexible and capable of great variety; it can absorb the most archaic inversion and the flattest colloquialism. It is a good line for verse-drama.

The ultimate question is: Can these plays be performed? I am not qualified to answer. But Rexroth has obviously written them with performance in mind, and I think I should like to see them if they were well done. The doing would be hard, for these plays are to be performed as a dance, formally, arbitrarily. In each of them the highest moment is an actual dance, and therefore the music would be important too. Only the most imaginative of directors could make this attempt, and even he would consult the poet often. Yet the attempt should be made.

HAYDEN CARRUTH

Science: the Test of Ideas

SCIENCE AND COMMON SENSE. By James B. Conant. Yale University Press. $4.

FOR the purposes of this book President Conant postulates an intelligent but uninformed layman to whom he proceeds to explain the aims and methods of contemporary physical science. The intention is not wholly unlike that of Karl Pearson's nineteenth-century classic "The Grammar of Science," and the most interesting as well as the most original sections are those explaining the shift of emphasis which has taken place largely as the result of the paradoxes inherent in modern physics.

There is, says President Conant, no such thing as "the" method of science, and Pearson's once orthodox assumption that the collection and classification of facts is the first step in any fruitful investigation is quite wrong. Science, as distinguished from the practice of traditional mechanical arts, does not arise until experiment is directed toward the testing of "speculative general ideas," and the extent to which a science has reached maturity is measured by the extent to which it has freed itself from purely empirical procedures. Essentially it is not so much a body of known facts as "an interconnected series of concepts and conceptual schemes that have developed as a result of experimentation and observation and are fruitful of further experimentation and observation."

Such a definition is of course in line with the thinking of modern physicists, who have been driven to the assumption that science's account of the order and meaning of phenomena is not a simple statement of what "really is" but a frequently paradoxical intellectual construction meaningful to the human mind and fruitful of results even though its relation to "ultimate reality"—if there is any such thing—is dubious. President Conant not only accepts this fact but devotes the major part of his book to an account of various crucial scientific discoveries which came about in a fashion illustrative of his thesis that, even during the early scientific renaissance, it was not the mere collection and arrangement of observed fact but the testing of conceptual schemes that was responsible for the fundamental discoveries.

Thus, to take a single example, the existence of the atmosphere as a fluid having weight was not the result of simple empirical observations but of attempts to test the ancient concept of the "full universe," and the most significant aspect of the discoveries of Torricelli and Pascal was the substitution of one conceptual scheme for another. In his view, therefore, the scientific renaissance of the seventeenth century did not come about because, as used to be said, men began to be more interested in induction than in deduction but rather because, for the first time in history, deductive methods began to be applied to the data accumulated by mechanics and artisans whose methods were purely empirical and who had no "conceptual schemes."

This interesting and important thesis tends rather to run away with a volume whose avowed purpose seems to be somewhat more narrowly practical and didactic. The result is that the lay reader will get a good deal of theoretical enlightenment but may feel that he has not been told as convincingly as he expected to be told just how, why, and to what extent he should leave his problems in the hands of the scientists. In fact, the concluding chapters, dealing with such subjects as Federal Funds for Fundamental Research and Value Judgments and the Social Scientist, are so brief, so general, and so hurried as to seem very inconclusive indeed. To me, at least, the last-mentioned chapter seems to miss the point. The fact that doctors generally agree that medicine should save lives does not prove the incorrectness of the common thesis that "science is neutral so far as value judgments are concerned." What it actually does do is to confirm that opinion, since the value judgment concerning the

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worth of human life obviously comes from outside the science of medicine and is not a scientific judgment at all.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

Cluttered Perspective

VALIANT PILGRIM. The Story of John Bunyan and Puritan England. By Vera Brittain. The Macmillan Company. $4.

IN A recent poll designed to name the "most boring classic" "Pilgrim's Progress" won first place without serious opposition. Mrs. Brittain, if she knew of the poll, would certainly demand a recount. But if the outlook for Bunyan is not so dull as the pollsters envisage it, neither is it so glorious as she portrays it.

Since his death, it is true, he has steadily if slowly gained the attention of the educated and won the praise of discerning critics. On the other hand, during the last half-century at least, he has as steadily lost much of the mass appeal he enjoyed for two centuries. He is the victim of the decline of evangelical zeal. Though he speaks profound truths with luminous simplicity and though he had remarkable understanding of what we now call psychology, he uses a frame of reference either totally unknown or only dimly familiar to vast numbers of present-day readers. Students of the history of human rights recognize Bunyan as a valiant and determined fighter for one of the most precious of these, the freedom of conscience and belief. Since all too few, however, yet fully understand the fundamental importance of this freedom, he is not now widely revered as a champion of man's liberty.

It is with Bunyan the champion of faith and of freedom of conscience that Mrs. Brittain is chiefly concerned. Certainly she is most effective in portraying the known facts of his rather uneventful life. For his youth she leans heavily on his partial autobiography "Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners." In fact, it may be said that she uses this book uncritically, for she seems not to realize fully that in it Bunyan was more interested in giving positive proof of his youthful depravity than in recording simple biographical facts. She fully recounts his career as pastor and itinerant preacher and the frustrations and dangers he faced because of his determination to save souls in defiance of the Crown and of the Church of England. Bunyan stands out as a passionate advocate, stubborn, fearless, aflame with zeal to rescue frail humanity from a very real hell and draw it to an equally actual heaven.

The treatment of Bunyan the literary artist is far less effective. All his many books are noted, and "Pilgrim's Progress," "The Holy War," and "The Life and Death of Mr. Badman" are given extended consideration. Too much stress is placed, however, on possible parallels between the stories and the characters and events and persons in Bunyan's life. Much of the analysis is uncritical, and the very interesting subject of style is neglected.

Though the bibliography is inadequate, the book gives evidence not only of great energy and of delight in the subject but also of a vast amount of research. The many excellent photographs with which the book is illustrated add much to the reader's knowledge of places important in Bunyan's life.

The author's excessive eagerness to make Bunyan both real and great, however, leads her into many bad practices. The work is cluttered with very long and minute descriptions of buildings, bridges, rivers, and streets. One has the impression that every physical spot that Bunyan may have looked at is portrayed in detail. The forcing of a sense of intimacy by the constant use of Bunyan's first name by itself is annoying. Even more serious is the author's habit of stating as fact matters she cannot possibly know, such as the thoughts of Bunyan's parents as they carried him to his christening, what flowers grew outside the houses Bunyan visited, or exactly what species of bird he frightened into flight as he made his way to a secret woodland conventicle. Finally there are such errors of fact as the statement that Milton's masques started a literary fashion, the assertion that "the far-reaching claims of the papacy were archaic" in the seventeenth century, and the reference to one of the best-known students of the period, David Masson, as Professor Gustave Masson.

The wings of Mrs. Brittain's enthusiasm are not strong enough to carry her readers to the height of her rapture.

DONALD A. ROBERTS

Return of a Native

THE BROKEN ROOT. By Arturo Barea. Translated from the Spanish by Ilsa Barea. Harcourt, Brace and Company. $3.50.

IN THAT seedtime of war, the thirties, the theme of exile bulked large in fictional literature, and it is to be expected that at war's end the finale to exodus should be written. The return of the native is an old story, appearing, like most old stories, at its best in "Hamlet" and Homer. Usually spoiled by lush episodes with faithful dogs and ecstatic shivers occasioned by the familiar, it has not frequently been as modestly told as by Arturo Barea in his recently published novel, "The Broken Root."

After ten years as a political refugee in England, Mr. Barea's exile, Don Antolin Moreno, returns to Spain. Not in the least sure that he will stay, uncertain as to the wisest division of a small capital accumulated by working as a head waiter in London, and fearful of provoking a pretense at affection, Antolin goes to a boarding-house where he can survey his family and country at a distance. What strikes his eye is below hope and beyond redemption—a microcosm of Spain itself. His wife, Luisa, has become a household drudge whose only escape from toil is spiritualism; his daughter, Amelia, a shiftless hypocrite spiting the world by religious mania; his youngest son, Juan, a poorly paid worker with little skill and a Communist spiting the world by political mania; his eldest son, Pedro, a Falangist black marketeer and pimp; his Spain "a place where every good thing is poisoned and every bad thing grows." In Antolin everyone sees a private dream come true—a debtor obliged to pay for their misery. His wife wants a new flat and a dutiful, bank-clerk husband so that decent people can call again. Amelia angles for a dowry to assure herself of a good job at the convent she wishes to enter. Pedro tries to work the old man for a monetary boost into the cocaine traffic, and Juan stumbles about in the hope of securing either money for the party or access to a big deal whose revelation will impress the party bosses with his diligence and loyalty. In the battle for spoils which develops as soon as private dreams are made public, Pedro put the Falange on

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to Juan, and Amelia through the agency of her confessor acts to have her mother's spiritualist group broken up by the police. As a result Juan is murdered by the Falange, and Luisa, deprived of her seer, loses her wits. Antolin patches up the shattered family by buying his daughter's way into the convent and providing a nurse for his stricken wife. After his son's funeral he prepares to cut short the native's return and live as a broken root in England.

The point, of course, is obvious; indeed, it is too explicitly made. Like many political novelists Mr. Barea lets ideology do the work of drama, thereby fashioning contrived action and wooden characters. Nevertheless, the portrait of a Communist who is neither a professional revolutionary nor a starving laborer with seven children but a sorry and neglected individual whose political commitment gives him a sense of importance can pass for subtle in a day when Wall Street Marxism identifies passing the rice around with putting an end to communism. In addition, the treatment of the churchmen, though harsh, is refreshingly bare of the pious sentimentality that in American and English literature shrouds most representatives of the religious bureaucracy. And finally, the suggestion of the utter purposelessness breeding in the Spanish mire of filth, corruption, and ignorance fully justifies the warning—applicable on all levels—that Spain is a place to be only if escape is impossible.

JOSEPH KRAFT

The Vatican View

THE VATICAN AND ITS ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Charles Pichon. Translated from the French by Jean Misrahi. E. P. Dutton and Company. $4.50.

THIS book bears the "imprimatur" of Cardinal Spellman. On the fly-leaf it displays also a letter to the author from the Papal Secretariat of State informing him that His Holiness read several chapters of it, expressed "His august satisfaction," and congratulated M. Pichon not only "because of his proven attachment to the Holy See," but also because "his information is seldom in error." A book that makes its bow to the public under such "august" auspices is entitled to some consideration.

In the French original M. Pichon, a well-known correspondent of French newspapers in Rome for many years, had called his book "Histoire du Vatican." This title was changed in the American translation, not because it might have appeared too ambitious, but because it was not ambitious enough. In fact, we are told in the Foreword that this book "is not merely a history." Its author intended to show also that "the acts of heroism" of the church and of the papacy do not belong only to the past but also to the present and that "further splendors are to come in the future." In common language this means that this "history" is a book of Catholic apologetics and propaganda with a tinge of prophetism to boot.

In the same Foreword, signed by both the author and the translator, we are told also that while many books are available which offer adequate accounts of the history of most countries, "there is none which treats of the most ancient of the great powers," the papacy. We assume that this does not mean that M. Pichon does not know of any other book dealing with the political history of the Vatican, as if he were living behind some iron curtain, but only that in M. Pichon's judgment there is not in the large historical literature on this subject a single "adequate" book and that this gap has been finally filled by M. Pichon's own book. We are afraid that the pontifical blessing has seriously affected M. Pichon's sense of modesty.

To remain within the sphere of Catholic scholarship and within the limits of one-volume works, L. Sturzo's "Church and State—Historical-Sociological Study" is a thoughtful exposition and interpretation, at times even bold for a Catholic theologian, of the impact of papal ideas and programs of action upon the political and social conditions of Europe throughout the centuries. In dealing with the recent period of papal policies Sturzo's keen critical sense is dulled by his sense of ecclesiastical discipline; yet his pages on the political and social program of Leo XIII are perhaps the best ever written from a Catholic but not fanatical point of view. Only a few years ago appeared also Bernhart's "Der Vatican als Weltmacht," which created a stir in Catholic circles and was translated into several modern languages. In spite of its limitations and its rhetorical emphasis, Bernhart's book outlines effectively the dramatic contrast between the ideal and the reality, between the sacred and the profane, the temporal and the spiritual elements of papal policies and aspirations to universal domination. It compares very favorably with M. Pichon's "History of the Vatican," which is a kind of potpourri of exuberant journalistic impressions thrown together with the presumption of writing history.

M. Pichon has given only eighty-two pages to almost nineteen hundred years of papal history, from the beginning to the death of Pius IX, and over three hundred pages to the last seventy years. This disproportion was intentional, because the past history has only the func-

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

TYRANT
from ILLINOIS
By BLAIR BOLLES

"A lucid, often amusing, occasionally terrifying account of the way in which American politics is managed . . . He (the author) brings in enough to explode the myth of the national scoundrel . . . The book is loaded with admirable thumbnail sketches of figures that once loomed terrifically upon the national horizon . . . an excellent job."—*N. Y. Herald Tribune Book Review*

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tion of providing the "background" of contemporary papal political and social history. In reality this supposedly "adequate" background or synthesis of nineteen centuries of pontifical history is nothing more than a series of often disconnected episodes—it jumps from Charlemagne straight to Gregory VII—forming a kind of loose summary of general church history such as might be used in Catholic Sunday schools.

An outline history of the popes is given in only one chapter, From Leo XIII to Pius XII. It is followed by three more which form the bulk of the book and deal respectively with the expansion of Catholic missions, with the movement for the union of the churches, and with the Vatican. The third is titled Between Washington and Moscow. The historical literature covering this period, both Catholic and non-Catholic, is very large. M. Pichon has given us a mere summary in which the traditional and worn-out clichés of Catholic modern historiography concerning the last five popes are recast in the most extravagant language. We hear once more of Leo XIII, "a political genius," founder of Christian Democracy and discoverer of the Social Question; of Pius X, a saintly pope who crushed the deadly heresy of modernism and freed the church of France from the clutches of the atheist state; of Benedict XV, the sleepless apostle of peace; of Pius XI, who possessed both the political genius of Leo and the religious fire of Pius and who by a chain of concordats brought back God to Italy and many other nations; and finally of Pius XII, another apostle of peace and the pope of "social Catholicism."

France, of course, often holds the center of the stage in this picture. In his description of the political activities of Leo XIII, M. Pichon has preferred to pass over in silence the fact that most of Leo's papal maneuvers and diplomatic intrigues were dictated by his plan to raise enemies against Italy in the hope of recovering the lost Papal States. On the contrary, historians will be surprised to learn that the alliance of France "with the monarchs of St. Petersburg" was the work of Leo XIII, who thus "spared France from being crushed in 1914 by the Germans." They will learn also that in the Lateran agreements with Mussolini, Pius XI received only 700,000,000 gold lire but not that one billion lire in state bonds was added to those millions according to the agreement. Very interesting will be the revelation that Pope Pius XI concluded "more than forty concordats" with nations, while only about a dozen are known to have been made.

Writing about the concordat of Pius XI with Hitler, M. Pichon remarks that the Vatican "had no illusions about Hitler and his band of thieves." Yet the Holy See "signed the concordat, according to its invariable custom, first because regimes are passing and written documents are more lasting, and then because a refusal would have put it in a most unfavorable position." We wonder what Pius XII, if he read this chapter, must have thought of the statement that it is the invariable custom of the Holy See to come to agreements with bands of thieves either for the sake of gaining some advantages or out of fear of reprisals. L. Sturzo, who is a good theologian, confronted with the problem of the Fascist and Nazi concordats, raised at least indirectly the question whether collaboration with evil is permitted under any circumstances. M. Pichon has no such scruples. He believes that, after all, those concordats did not confer upon the Duce or the Führer "a sort of consecration in the eyes of all the Catholics."

In the long chapter called Union of the Churches, M. Pichon traces back the whole history of the origin of the eastern schism and of Protestantism and then deals at length with the movement for the union of churches which has lately been so active in the Protestant world. Here he has written some interesting pages which also manifest his sincere effort to understand the point of view of the dissident churches. He writes without the bitterness usual to Catholic historians when dealing especially with Protestantism. But the part of the Vatican in this movement has been only negative. It has rejected every offer to discuss the matter, holding a priori that the union of churches can be achieved only by their unconditional surrender to papal teaching and jurisdiction.

The last chapter describes in glowing colors the progress of Catholicism in the United States, where "the policies of the White House seem to be the present-day application of the maxims of St. Paul, St. Thomas Aquinas, and of Leo XIII" and where the Pope and the Catholic hierarchy are considered to be the stalwart defenders of liberty and democracy. American Catholics, being essentially Irish, are devoted to the papacy, but "though they have no objection to the *Latin* tradition in the church, they are somewhat less cordial to the Italians." Does this mean that the Americans would prefer, let us say, a French pope? M. Pichon then mentions incidentally the delicate question of Catholic-American resentment at not having a larger share in the central government of the church in Rome. Pius XII already has a couple of American prelates in the diplomatic service, and more will be called in the near future, because the Pope "on occasion accepts the assistance of American forces, simply because a purely spiritual power in certain cases needs temporal assistance." But this does not mean that the Vatican subordinates its policies to those of Washington; on the other hand, the White House cannot at present adopt an entirely "Catholic policy."

The irreconcilable conflict between the Vatican and Moscow has its parallel to that of Washington and Moscow. There is a fundamental coincidence of the interests—temporal and spiritual—of the Vatican and those of the United States in their struggle against the common enemy. They are both fighting for liberty and democracy. Only a close alliance of these two powers may save the world. It must have been a rather bitter experience for M. Pichon to be unable to say that France, *la fille ainée de l'Eglise*, cannot be depended on to save mankind once more, and that the old noble

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mission assigned to France, *Gesta Dei per Francos,* is now superseded by that of the United States, *Gesta Dei per Americanos.* GEORGE LA PIANA

The Evolutionist View

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLIGENCE. By Jean Piaget. Harcourt, Brace and Company. $3.50.

THE pragmatic or evolutionist view has an effective exponent in Professor Piaget. Famous for his brilliant work in genetic psychology, he presents a brief discussion of intelligence as the culmination of growth, in virtue of its "sensorimotor" component or affinities, its variability and spontaneity, together with the freedom that constitutes subjectivity. His emblem of course as an evolutionist is that he notes the similarity of thought to other organic events, but he is conscious of the differences too. No doubt the evolutionist view is a sort of jaded perfectionism; but perhaps the essential vulnerability of every idea lies in the degree in which it is of necessity unconsciously moralistic. This means neither the defeat of "intellect" nor the primacy of "morals": "motivation" being a useful hypothesis (yet quite crude even though less "anthropomorphic" than, for example, logic) because, for one thing, it supplies a sort of implicit prototype of both behavior and logic, though one could also assume, with Hegel, that logic comes first; the dilemma is that of the chicken or the egg. No doubt "function" is the best moral concept we have, or the only one, but the synechist view of intelligence will prove much subtler than Piaget expects. The ideal of sanguine inadvertence may not, in fact, be a pitfall. That the ethicist prepossession is methodology itself is beautifully shown by Piaget's belief—vague, conceivably fruitful, certainly dubious—that the progress of intelligence depends on the decline of egocentricity.

Piaget is friendly to *Gestalt* psychology even though it tends to see in the obvious adaptiveness of intelligence evidence of an esoteric, possibly impersonal or even "static" design. *Gestalt* psychology seems indeed, like Whitehead's philosophy, to emanate from the absence of a cogent distinction between "organic" and "inorganic": the fact that "intelligence" is distinctly "active" is naively related in Piaget's mind to the separation of psychology from metaphysics. It is ironic rather than inconsistent, however unfortunate, that symbolic logic, despite the vigor with which Piaget challenges the pretensions that form its connection with certain philosophic schools, nevertheless supplies his final definition of intelligence. Otherwise the book is unexceptionable. Even though it eschews the profuse statistical methods and material, it presents the hypothesis by which they must be construed. MARTIN LEBOWITZ

Books in Brief

TYRANT FROM ILLINOIS. By Blair Bolles. Norton. $4.50. The story of Uncle Joe Cannon, an ingrained conservative who as Speaker of the House of Representatives made himself dictator of Congress and the most powerful man in Washington from 1906 to 1910. By stemming for too long and too sternly the rising tide of progressivism, Uncle Joe was to some extent responsible for the reaction that swept Woodrow Wilson into power. An interesting study of the methods employed by Cannon to consolidate his power and by La Follette and George Norris to destroy it.

JOURNEY INTO LIGHT. By Ishbel Ross. Appleton-Century. $4. A detailed and readable book about the blind and about the men and women who have achieved greatness under this handicap or who have labored to alleviate and educate its victims.

MY SIX CONVICTS: A PSYCHOLOGIST'S THREE YEARS IN FORT LEAVENWORTH. By Donald Powell Wilson. Rinehart. $3.50. The director of a research project in drug-addiction, which he carried on inside Leavenworth Prison for three years during the thirties, sketches with humor and insight his relations with the six convicts whom he trained to be his assistants and who in turn gave him an extra-curricular course in human nature and the workings of prison protocol. The story is told with a real flair for character and incident, and is incidentally a very persuasive plea for the new penology as the author saw it in effect at Leavenworth.

Music

B. H. HAGGIN

HAVING learned from the Metropolitan's new production of "Don Carlo" what kind of opera Mr. Bing would like to give, I attended a performance of "Il Trovatore" to see what kind he is giving meanwhile with standard repertory that hasn't been newly studied, designed, and staged. For the eye it was, I am sure, the kind he hopes to do away with; and I have in mind not scenery and costumes but the absurd things people did on the stage. Could these not be changed even with the old scenery and costumes? Could not thought and work be devoted to the activity of the chorus; could not Kurt Baum's arms be tied to his sides, and similar means, if necessary, be used to keep Fedora Barbieri from tossing herself about in a storm of emotion and action?

For the ear, on the other hand, there was the succession of great melodic structures that Verdi contrived for this opera, superbly sung, especially by Leonard Warren and Zinka Milanov. I had last heard Milanov in 1943, at a time when she had an insecure method of voice production that might cause her to go through most of a perfor-

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mance with tremolo-ridden stridency and then suddenly begin to produce tones of marvelous purity and beauty; and I recall a performance of "Norma" in which she sang not only with such beauty but with breathtaking phraseological continuity and style. In the years since then, by the evidence of the recent "Il Trovatore," she seems to have acquired secure technical control, but also to have paid the inevitable penalty for her earlier lack of it: where formerly she would have sung the several high notes of an aria with full voice she now produced the earlier ones as exquisite pianissimo head tones and only the last with full voice that had clarity and power but not the lusciousness of former years.

Concerning the newly produced "Die Fledermaus" I will say first that it confirmed my previous experience with opera in English; and I speak of this first because of the alarming rumor that Mr. Bing is planning to give "Così Fan Tutte" in English and that English is to replace Italian in the New York City Opera Company's "Don Giovanni." The argument for the use of English is that an audience needs to know what an opera is about, that it must be able to get this knowledge directly from the performance without preliminary reading of a libretto, and that for this purpose English must be used in a performance for an American audience as German is used for the audience in Berlin or Vienna. At "Die Fledermaus" I tested this once more—i.e. I got my knowledge of the dramatic action directly from the performance; and though I sat in seats that were excellent for hearing I found that I could hear the English words when they were spoken, even with the foreign accents of Ljuba Welitch and Set Svanholm, but could not distinguish most of them when they were sung, even by Patrice Munsel and John Brownlee, and that as a result I got a very fragmentary and inadequate knowledge of what was going on. Not only that, but when I strained to hear the words I didn't hear the music. And all this, as I said before, confirmed previous experience.

The fact is that an audience does need to know what "Così Fan Tutte" is about, but that in theaters the size of the Metropolitan it cannot get this knowledge from the performance; and that even if the opera is sung in English an American has to read a libretto beforehand, just as the German reads a libretto before a performance in German. And I contend that if advance reading has to be done it should be done for a performance in Italian which retains the delightful effect of the sound of the Italian words with Mozart's music (the post-war productions of Mozart's operas in Vienna have used Italian; and if I remember correctly the innovation has been extended to Verdi). Also, with advance reading for a performance in Italian there won't be a concentration of attention on the words, and the following of the dramatic action will be such as not to distract attention from the music—a recognition of what one already knows, not a straining to discover what one doesn't know.

The new English translation by Garson Kanin and lyrics by Howard Dietz were only part of all that Mr. Bing did to make "Die Fledermaus" entertaining to the Metropolitan's audiences: there were also scenery and costumes by Rolf Gerard, staging by Mr. Kanin, a cast of first-line singers, a ballet by Antony Tudor. And the audience of the performance I attended seemed to be greatly entertained; but for myself I must report that I found the humor of the work to be of the kind that is accepted as such only in the opera house; and while I could imagine the work being put across by the cast of brilliant singing actors my European friends tell me Max Reinhardt assembled and by the kind of theatrical brilliance he contrived, nothing like that happened at the Metropolitan. What I enjoyed was the music, the singing, and Jack Gilford's solo clown routine in the last act.

Listening to Charles Ives's Second Symphony, which Leonard Bernstein performed with the New York Philharmonic, I heard nothing that should have kept it from being played fifty years ago, but on the other hand nothing that called urgently for performance now. The great to-do about Ives's having used this or that revolutionary technique years before this or that famous European composer is about something irrelevant and unimportant: the important thing is what music he produced with whatever technique he used. It is especially irrelevant in the case of the Second Symphony which contains nothing horrendous that should have frightened conductors fifty years ago. And when one considers this work in and for itself as it reveals itself to the ear, one hears this bit of lovely writing here, that bit of lovely melody there, but in sum a constant shifting from one thing to another in one tempo and another in a succession that rambles on with no integration and no cumulative effect.

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Letters to the Editors

Hawkins Case Not Prejudged

Dear Sirs: In his article The Case of David Hawkins (*The Nation,* March 10), Carey McWilliams ventures the guess that "the 'trial' will be long drawn out and will poison the atmosphere of free inquiry at Boulder as surely as the loyalty inquisitions have poisoned the atmosphere at Berkeley and Seattle." If this prediction should come true, Mr. McWilliams and his informer could claim a share of the credit for it by having distorted facts and made unwarranted insinuations.

Mr. McWilliams failed to mention that the "charges" against David Hawkins were allegations made by the public and press, collected and presented by President Stearns, a former dean of the Law School, in accordance with principles of judicial procedure. President Stearns stated publicly on February 15 that by announcing the charges "the university has not prejudged the case. . . . In any judicial inquiry it is necessary to define the scope of the hearings." The charges, he continued, "consist of questions of alleged fact. The committee [on privilege and tenure] must determine the truth or falsity of the statements and make its findings thereon."

The sixth charge is misquoted by Mr. McWilliams as "sponsorship of a Marxist Study Group"; actually the charge is that as sponsor of this group Mr. Hawkins "permitted it to become a political-action committee rather than restrict its activities to a study group as authorized by its charter."

On February 1 President Stearns declared publicly that admission by Mr. Hawkins of previous membership in the Communist Party "is not sufficient ground for his summary dismissal." Of David Hawkins, who by the way has many well-wishers on this campus including myself, Mr. Stearns further said, "He has been an excellent teacher and a valuable member of the university community."

In commenting on a separate investigation, carried on apart from the Hawkins case, of "possible Communist influence among faculty members," Mr. McWilliams states that it is to be made by two former FBI agents and that "their use raises the question whether only the methods of political police were adequate." Actually the regents authorized an investigation by "experienced and qualified counsel." The investigators are graduates of our Law School who happened to have worked with the FBI during the war. Whether or not "some doubt may be felt about their ability to rise above local pressures and prejudices" can be judged only after their report has been received. One reason for employing outsiders instead of faculty members may have been a desire to avoid all suspicion of a whitewash. On February 3 Mr. Stearns stated publicly that "good will be accomplished if we reserve judgment until all the evidence is in, and until we reach conclusions and take action on the basis of fact. . . . Harm will come from engendering suspicions, creating doubts, and making false accusations based only on surmise."

Finally, Mr. McWilliams reveals his prejudice by referring to a speech made by Howard Mumford Jones on the Boulder campus recently and by concluding his article with the words, "One can only wonder whether Dr. Jones would be invited to repeat this speech today." I trust that my quotations from Dr. Stearns will be an adequate answer.

KARL F. MUENZINGER

Boulder, Col., March 13

No Good Will Come of It

Dear Sirs: In the first place, I have no "informer" at the University of Colorado; my feeling about informers is, I think, well known.

I am well aware that the administration of the University of Colorado is "decent and honest" and that President Robert L. Stearns is a fine man, keenly aware of the importance of academic freedom. Unfortunately the history of similar issues at Seattle and Berkeley has convinced me that investigations of this type have a logic of their own.

I not only believe that the atmosphere may be poisoned at Boulder as a result of the hearings and the investigation, but I firmly believe that hearings and investigations of this character necessarily produce an impairment of, or limitation upon, academic freedom. Naturally I hope that this impairment can be minimized at Boulder, but in part it has already occurred. President Allen of the University of Washington also said, and no doubt believed, that the hearings at Seattle could result in great good or great harm; but I think it would be hard to find many members of the faculty of the University of Washington who now believe that any good can come from such hearings.

At Boulder as at Seattle, a political test will be used to determine general fitness under a tenure code; I contend that the effect of this is to destroy the meaning of tenure. Doubtless President Stearns will do everything in his power to prevent a repetition at Boulder of what has happened at Seattle and Berkeley, but—to repeat—the issue does not turn on his good faith or his intentions. I only wish it did.

CAREY MCWILLIAMS

Los Angeles, March 20

Fear and Freedom

Dear Sirs: The undergraduate leaders of Wesleyan University's annual student parley invited Communist leaders Henry Winston and John Gates to speak this year because they believed that "real live Communists" would enlighten the topic to be discussed: "Can Communism and Capitalism Coexist?" The parley's panel of speaker, however,

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reflected anything but Communist control: it included the managing editor of *Counterattack*, T. C. Kirkpatrick, and Tilford Dudley, a Wesleyan alumnus and attorney for the C. I. O.-P. A. C.

On March 11 David Snell, a radio commentator, noticed a piece about the parley in the *Daily Worker*. In his network program over WOR that afternoon he censured its leaders for inviting the Communists. Soon Wesleyan alumni and Middletown citizens were overwhelming them with telephone calls and telegrams. The acting mayor of Middletown remarked that no Communist would speak in Middletown as long as he had anything to say about the matter.

The students in charge of the program, Charlie Ellis and Bill McCluskey, under no pressure from the Wesleyan administration but fearing another Peekskill incident, withdrew their invitations to the Communists. The Hartford *Courant*, in a fine editorial, commented that if freedom "can live only because some other doctrine has been suppressed in its favor, it has been puny and weak."

The Wesleyan story shows once more that fear throws an iron curtain of dogma over our thought and robs us of the freedom which once we cherished.

JOHN E. WILLIAMS

Middletown, Conn., March 14

Cooperation Is Cheaper

Dear Sirs: It was painful to read Stuart Chase's article Paths to Labor Peace in *The Nation* of March 17. In the first place, the piece was little more than a condensation of Selekman's book and might better have been printed as a book review. In the second place, Chase's idea of labor-management "cooperation" is about as realistic as wearing snowshoes in hell.

As every mature person knows, there exist in the labor movement both conservative and liberal, or radical, union officials. Those employers who feel they can avoid the penalties imposed by unions damn both types of officials with equal fury. But where the union is there to stay and a frontal attack against it would be unfeasible, the employer usually proceeds by a flank movement. Directly or indirectly he tries to aid the more moderate unionists to stay in power. The savings in dollars and cents in this type of "cooperation" runs into a lot of money.

Ordinarily before such cooperation is achieved, the union has to beat the employer to a frazzle in innumerable fights. That was true of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and the clothing manufacturers. At a certain stage in the war the employers decided it would be cheaper—please note the word cheaper—to try to deal with moderate unionists rather than face the danger of boiling the pot in negotiations each year. Furthermore, once the industry was totally organized there was little to lose, since wage increases had to be paid by all manufacturers and were no factor in competition between them.

The implication in the Chase article is that all we need for cooperation is the rule of reason. This may sound well to those who know nothing of labor unions but it has a dull ring in the ears of people who live in the movement. Cooperation is practiced only where the employer is reasonably sure that the union can put him through a costly strike if some compromise is not worked out. The only way for labor to win cooperation is by being strong.

Can Mr. Chase give me one instance of cooperation not based on the considerations I have mentioned in this letter?

SID LENS

Chicago, Ill., March 20

No Debate

Dear Sirs: I find it hard to see any grounds for a debate with Mr. Lens. He says employers never cooperate with labor except from a profit motive. Being no mind-reader, I cannot prove motives, and will not argue with him, as long as he agrees that employers sometimes *behave* in a cooperative way. He says cooperation works best when a union is strong; this is correct and I have often made the same point. I wish Mr. Lens had committed himself about the Selekman classification. Apparently he belongs either in the second stage—class-struggle ideology—or in the fourth—power bargaining.

My forthcoming book, "Roads to Agreement," on which the article was based, is addressed to people who want to reach agreement and avoid conflict, and describes many methods, both in the labor field and out of it. I am afraid it is not a very good start to make a reader as angry as Mr. Lens seems to be, but perhaps the book will find other readers who are not so upset by the mere idea of peace.

STUART CHASE

Georgetown, Conn., March 25

Savagery in South Africa

Dear Sirs: Recently much has been written about the condition of natives in South Africa, but I doubt if many Americans realize the naked savagery of the white man's attitude toward his black neighbor. After a six-month visit to my Africaner father's farm in Transvaal I feel it is no exaggeration to say that natives in South Africa are treated worse than slaves.

On the farm the African works sixteen or eighteen hours a day. His entire diet, prescribed by law, consists of three pounds of mealie-meal (cornmeal mush) made with water, unrelieved by vegetables, meats, fruits, or milk. Despite the large number of diseased, dying, and anemic natives, most farmers will argue stubbornly that this is an adequate diet.

Though they get better food, the natives in towns are in some respects worse off. They are required to live either in compounds or locations. Compounds are army-like barracks surrounded by barbed wire, to which the inmates are not allowed to bring their families. The "locations" are separated from the white community by a stretch of vacant land. They are without streets, sewerage, or utilities. In them the natives are separated from tribal law and customs, denied all human rights, subjected to constant brutality and hunger.

Only in the "reserves" may a native own property, work, and live as a member of the human race. But here, too, overcrowded conditions and poor farm methods have reduced his living standards to starvation level.

What is being done about this situation? Nothing. White South Africa is frantically searching for an answer to the question: "How can we keep the natives down and still keep communism from appealing to them?" Many natives feel that if they are too uneducated to be given the franchise, after four centuries of white rule, something needs to be changed. However, don't think that either white or black South Africa will heed sermons from America. Even the natives have had entirely too much experience with whites "interested in their welfare."

So if one day you read in your newspapers that the original Sons of Africa have started a revolution, don't be too surprised. After all, the black man has waited patiently for nearly four centuries for the white man to become civilized.

MARY MOSTERT

Memphis, Tenn., March 10

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Crossword Puzzle No. 407

BY FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 Half-pint and Friar? Pretty close! (3, 3, 4)
6 and 14 down Evidently Goldilocks' villain isn't sinister! (4, 2, 3, 5)
10 Kept under glass, perhaps. (7)
11 and 25 down Good-looking portrait of Abe? (1, 6, 5)
12 Sides of cans, it might be. (8)
13 March-time has this as a natural consequence. (5)
15 This animal came out of Chevy Chase without a burn. (5)
17 Such things don't follow. (9)
19 Skip the drink? I'm game! (9)
21 Fruit of which 13 has 2½ dozen. (5)
23 Norman's Woe and the Great Barrier, for example. (5)
24 Compendium of heads. (8)
27 Cryptic? (7)
28 Kipling got a chunk of a paddle from it. (7)
29 Edward's spreads out. (4)
30 Recurring spirit of battle. (10)

DOWN

1 Scratch, if it's old. (4)
2 See 20 down.
3 The childish cry before the game. (3, 2)
4 The first error is the thing that shows up such a man. (9)
5 Men who make cracks about your face? (5)
7 Typhoid is such a fever. (7)
8 Well suited to go straight to the top. (5, 5)
9 Are grand when planned. (8)
14 See 6.
16 Not sitting in a little alcove, perhaps. (8)
18 Look at the female smile! (Reminded of the wedding music, perhaps?) (9)
20 and 2 Musical versifier and a mean old man, perhaps. (4, 3, 7)
22 EEE, by the sound of it! (7)
24 Sounds like a county is more modest. (5)
25 See 11.
26 How brave men die. (4)

• • • • •

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 406

ACROSS:—1 FLIGHT OF FANCY; 10 REPEL; 11 EXECRABLY; 12 MALEMUTES; 13 DINGO; 14 INCOHERENTLY; 19 PRESS RELEASE; 22 NIGER; 24 MOUSE-TRAP; 25 CHARIVARI; 26 NAIVE; 27 STANDING ORDER.

DOWN:—2 LAPELS; 3 GOLD MINES; 4 TWENTY-ONE; 5 FLEAS; 6 AIRED; 7 CABINETS; 8 TRAMP; 9 SYNONYM; 15 EXECUTING; 16 EASTERNER; 17 SPINACH; 18 SERGEANT; 20 PRAISE; 21 SPEED; 23 REIGN; 24 MIAMI.

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